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ABSTRACT 
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 led to a fundamental reorganization of the U.S. 
immigration structure. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was abolished 
in 2003 and its missions were transferred into three distinct components within DHS: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This thesis focuses on 
the perceptions of USCIS employees on organizational change and collaboration in the 
DHS immigration structure that was established in 2003. Effective organizational change 
is essential for an agency to carry out policies and execute its missions. Collaboration is 
also vital to USCIS since it works closely with ICE in combating immigration benefit 
fraud to strengthen the security of the legal immigration system. 
This thesis identifies areas for USCIS regarding future organizational change and 
enhancements to collaboration with a homeland security partner such as ICE. It further 
identifies areas such as collaborative competencies, trust and networks to improve 
collaboration between USCIS and ICE in targeting immigration benefit fraud.  
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I.  INTRODUCING IMMIGRATION AS A HOMELAND 
SECURITY ISSUE 
A.  HOW 9/11 CHANGED THE U.S. IMMIGRATION STRUCTURE 
Since the attacks of 9/11, there has been a significant focus on the importance of 
immigration as a homeland security issue. Much of the recent emphasis on U.S. 
immigration policy has been on border security and worksite enforcement. Most would 
agree that both strategies are critical to homeland security in that they stem the flow of 
illegal aliens to include those who may want to inflict harm on America and identify 
aliens who are unauthorized to work in the U.S. However, immigration benefit fraud is 
also critical to homeland security, yet, it has not received the same focus or emphasis, 
especially in recent forums regarding comprehensive immigration reform. Immigration 
fraud is a significant concern to the legal immigration system because it undermines the 
rule of law and provides opportunities for terrorists to travel and reside legally within the 
U.S. Transnational organized crime and other criminal elements also enrich themselves in 
areas such as human trafficking by committing immigration fraud.1 Further, terrorists and 
other criminal elements can use immigration fraud to acquire legal immigration benefits 
and bypass increased border security efforts. 
The events of 9/11 are a reminder that the hijackers used the U.S. legal 
immigration system to enter, travel freely, train, and embed themselves in the United 
States, which enabled them to execute the terrorist attacks on 9/11. In fact, the hijackers 
successfully entered the U.S. 33 of 34 times, with the first arriving on January 15, 2000 at 
the Los Angeles International Airport.2 After the attacks occurred, the 9/11 Commission 
engaged in a concerted effort to learn why the U.S. government did not uncover the plot 
earlier and whether a lack of information sharing or a lack of urgency by federal 
                                                 
1 Asian Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/214186.pdf (accessed 
December 2008). 
2 Thomas R. Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel III, Janice L. Kephart, and Kelly Moore, 
9/11 and Terrorist Travel, Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, August 21, 2004, 12. 
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departments contributed to not identifying the plot sooner. The 9/11 Commission 
identified that the hijackers engaged in a well conceived plan that included obtaining U.S. 
visas overseas from the U.S. State Department, which allowed them to travel to U.S. 
airports to apply for inspection into the U.S., and eventually, apply for additional 
immigration benefits such as permission to attend pilot training and other permissible 
extensions of stay after their entry into the U.S. The 9/11 attacks illustrated why the U.S. 
needed a seamless immigration structure both in the U.S. and abroad to recognize 
terrorist threats, identify people engaging in immigration fraud and have organizational 
mechanisms to share information readily across multiple entities such as the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of State (DOS) that have immigration 
responsibilities. 
One could argue that a pivotal point that led to the abolishment of INS occurred 
shortly after 9/11. Six months following the events of 9/11, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) mistakenly sent approval notices that authorized 
immigration benefits for two of the 9/11 hijackers.3 President Bush ordered then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft and then-Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge to 
investigate how such a mistake could have happened when Mohamed Atta and Marwan 
al-Shehhi were widely known as two of the 9/11 hijackers.4 This error reinforced the 
public’s perception that INS was ill equipped to execute the nation’s immigration policy 
effectively in a post 9/11 environment. Consequently, a number of proposals were put 
forward that included an internal restructuring to completely abolishing the INS. Jeffery 
Manns indicates in “Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: the Abolition of the INS” 
that the five proposals included:  
(1) the INS’s internal reorganization plan; (2) and (3) the main House 
(Sensenbrenner-Gekas) and Senate (Brownback-Kennedy) proposals to 
create a new immigration agency with a sharper separation between 
service and enforcement bureaus; (4) the Bush Administration’s plan to 
                                                 
3 “4 Top Officials on Immigration Are Replaced Eric Schmitt,” New York Times (1857-Current file); 
March 16, 2002, ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851 - 2004), A1. 
4 Bush Orders Inquiry into Visas Issued to Terrorists after Attack, by Alison Mitchell Elisabeth 
Bumiller, New York Times (1857-Current file); March 14, 2002, ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851 - 
2004), A1. 
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subsume an unchanged INS into the proposed Department of Homeland 
Security; and (5) the likely legislative compromise to shift the INS’s 
enforcement functions to the Department of Homeland Security and leave 
the service functions in the Department of Justice (DOJ).5 
In 2003, the INS was abolished and its missions were transferred into three 
distinct components within DHS: 1) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
2) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 3) Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP). USCIS is now responsible for the adjudication of immigration benefits. ICE is 
responsible for interior immigration enforcement as well as the former U.S. Customs’ 
mission. CBP is primarily concerned with U.S. border security involving people and 
cargo as well as inspection duties at U.S. airports, seaports and port of entry points along 
the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian border.  
Initially, the new structure of USCIS, ICE and CBP was touted as a landmark 
event to partition immigration responsibilities into three areas: USCIS- immigration 
benefits, ICE- immigration enforcement, and CBP- border security. However, a recent 
Congressional Research Service report, which focused on immigration related 
organizational issues within DHS asked the following question concerning the efficacy of 
spreading immigration responsibilities amongst USCIS, ICE and CBP. 
Does this disaggregation of immigration operations sharpen the focus to 
perform the disparate functions and prompt a sense of responsibility across 
a broader set of managers- increasing the stakeholders and improving 
administration of immigration law and policies? Or does the dispersal of 
immigration functions muddy the chain of command and foster 
competition among priorities- leading to turf battles and thwarting the 
development of a comprehensive immigration policy?6  
                                                 
5 Jeffrey Manns, “Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of the INS,” The Yale Law 
Journal 1 (October 2002): 150. 
6 Ruth Ellen Wasem. Toward More Effective Immigration Policies: Selected Organizational Issues, 
CRS Report for Congress, RL33319 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2007), 28. 
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B.  HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION STRUCTURE 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Currently, there is little data available to support a superior organizational strategy 
accurately to optimize and align all aspects of the U.S. immigration structure. However, a 
historical review of the U.S. immigration structure shows that it has been in a constant 
state of organizational change. In “Inside the Immigration and Naturalization Service: 
The Organizational Dynamics of a Problem Agency,” Sharon Barrios outlined some of 
the noteworthy historical organization changes since its inception.  
In 1891, Congress adopted the Immigration Act of 1891 (26 Stat. 1084), 
creating the Office of Immigration. Since 1891, INS has been under the 
supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, Department of Commerce 
and Labor in 1903, to the new Department of Labor in 1913 where the 
immigration and naturalization functions were divided into two separate 
bureaus: the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization that 
were each headed by its own commissioner under the immediate 
supervision of the Secretary of Labor. In 1933, the Immigration Bureau 
and Naturalization Bureau were again combined within the Department of 
Labor and the one bureau was the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS). In 1940, the INS was transferred to the Department of Justice and 
from 1954 until mid-1990s it went through three centralizing and 
decentralizing reorganizations. The primary theme of the INS 
reorganizations between 1954 and the mid-1990s focused on levels of 
autonomy of field personnel versus intervention and control of HQ to 
attempt to balance central authority and local flexibility.7  
History has demonstrated that the U.S. immigration system has been fluid and has 
adapted to numerous changes since 1891. The post 9/11 immigration reforms are yet 
another change in a long history of changes to reorganize the U.S. immigration system. 
However, does reorganization equate to a successful reform? In the case of the current 
immigration structure, functions were divided between service (benefits) and 
enforcement. Further, enforcement was further divided between interior enforcement 
(investigations) and border security. One could say that “boundaries” were drawn in the 
hopes of making the immigration structure more efficient and effective than what 
                                                 
7 Sharon A. Barrios, Inside the Immigration and Naturalization Service: The Organizational Dynamics 
of a Problem Agency (PhD, diss., Princeton University, November 1999), 240-242. 
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occurred under INS. Drawing boundaries in public administration has been central to the 
administrative process because it defines the roles and responsibilities for each 
organization and what roles and responsibilities lie elsewhere.8 Donald Kettl describes a 
poignant story about John Wesley Powell, who headed the U.S. Geological Survey in the 
late 19th century in “Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The 
Collaboration Imperative.” Wallace Stegner who wrote Powell’s biography described the 
challenges in drawing boundaries on how water in the western U.S. would be distributed 
and allocated based on resource-based realities.  
Too often, Stegner explains, policy makers in faraway Washington 
sketched neat lines with little understanding of the implications of the 
decisions they were making. They often drew boundaries that confounded 
responsibility over water and, ever since, governments in the region have 
struggled with the mismatch of their boundaries, their assets, and their 
problems.9 
One might draw similar parallels in how Washington desired to draw water boundaries 
neatly in the western U.S. to neatly dividing the immigration functions into three distinct 
DHS components without a true understanding of the implications of the results. In 
keeping with the theme of creating boundaries and dividing immigration responsibilities, 
this thesis will strive to uncover some of the challenges and limitations that resulted from 
the reorganization of the U.S. immigration functions. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the INS and current DHS immigration structure. 
Although the immigration functions have been differentiated after 9/11, there are still 
many areas where integration occurs. As background, many of the individual 
responsibilities of USCIS, ICE, and CBP have an impact on each other in some fashion. 
USCIS adjudicates immigration benefits, which in some cases, allow people to apply for 
inspection and entry into the U.S. by CBP. If CBP detects fraud based on an immigration 
benefit at a port of entry that was approved by USCIS, mechanisms need to be in place to 
notify USCIS to take appropriate actions. As new immigration benefits emerge or if there 
                                                 
8 Donald F. Kettl, “Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration Imperative,” 
Public Administration Review, December 2006, 10. 
9 Ibid. 
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are changes to existing immigration policy, CBP and ICE need to be aware on how the 
new changes will affect enforcement and border security. ICE needs to keep USCIS 
aware of interior benefit fraud investigations to ensure the security of the legal 
immigration system and the granting of immigration benefits. Similarly, USCIS needs to 
keep ICE aware of benefit fraud patterns and trends developed internally by USCIS that 
may affect future benefit fraud investigations. Lastly, USCIS, ICE and CBP need to keep 
open channels of communication with the Department of State to guarantee that 
immigration benefit fraud identified at overseas consulates is shared throughout the 
USCIS, ICE and CBP network. This example is not to suggest that either the INS 
structure or DHS structure is superior to one another. Rather, it is to illustrate the 
interconnectedness of immigration policy, procedure and functions within the U.S. 
immigration system. Due to the complexity of immigration, both structures are 
challenged with implementing collaboration, awareness of each other’s responsibilities, 
how the disparate missions affect each other, and the ever, emerging immigration policies 
that make the U.S. immigration system so vibrant. The challenge for homeland security 
leaders is to be aware of, and when necessary, overcome the institutionalized boundaries 
created with the new DHS immigration structure.  
 




Immigration Responsibilities Were Contained Within One Immigration Agency (Pre 9/11)
Internal Organizational Boundaries
 
Figure 1.1. Internal Organizational Boundaries within INS 
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Immigration Responsibilities Were Divided Along Functional Lines In 3 Agencies (Post 9/11)
External Organizational Boundaries
 
Figure 1.2. Distinct Organizational Boundaries within DHS 
C.  NATURE OF IMMIGRATION BENEFIT FRAUD AND CURRENT 
IMMIGRATION STRUCTURE  
It is important to begin with a description of immigration benefit fraud and 
explain why it is important to U.S. homeland security efforts. Immigration fraud is 
generally grouped into two types: immigration-related document fraud and immigration 
benefit/qualification fraud:  
• Immigration-related document fraud includes counterfeiting, sale, and/or 
use of identity documents such as birth certificates and social security 
cards as well as passports, visas or any other documents to circumvent 
immigration laws. 
• Benefit/qualification fraud encompasses the willful misrepresentation of a 
material fact to qualify for a status or benefit under immigration law in the 
absence of lawful eligibility for that benefit. An example of benefit fraud 
would include entering into a sham marriage to claim to be the spouse of a 
U.S. citizen or omitting a disqualifying criminal conviction from an 
application to become a Lawful Permanent Resident of the U.S.10 
 
                                                 
10 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration Fraud: Policies, Investigations, and Issues (Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, Updated April 3, 2008), CRS Order Code RL34007, 2. 
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In order to highlight the significance of immigration benefit fraud as a homeland 
security matter, the Department of Homeland Security’s first goal in the (DHS) 2008 
Strategic Plan is to protect the U.S. from dangerous people. Goal 1 Objective 1.4 states 
that DHS will improve security through enhanced immigration services. 
We will increase our security by denying immigration benefits to persons 
wishing to do us harm and integrating our information with that of other 
Federal agencies with an aim of keeping out dangerous individuals. We 
will strengthen immigration fraud detection and other measures to protect 
the country while ensuring that we provide immigration benefits to 
eligible parties in a timely, efficient, and customer-centric manner.11 
DHS has clearly emphasized that it is a priority to ensure the security of the legal 
immigration system and to identify dangerous individuals who could use the legal 
immigration system to embed themselves in the U.S. to execute future attacks. USCIS 
will play a key role in supporting DHS Goal 1 Objective 1.4 by administering the legal 
immigration system. DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 authorized USCIS to investigate 
alleged fraud with respect to immigration applications.12 ICE will also be a key member 
in exercising its law enforcement responsibilities in ensuring the security of the 
immigration benefits system. DHS Delegation Number 7030.2 authorized ICE to 
investigate alleged fraud with respect to applications within the jurisdiction of CBP and 
USCIS.13  
The first goal in the current USCIS strategic plan is to strengthen the security and 
integrity of the immigration system. The second goal seeks to provide efficient customer-
oriented immigration benefits and information services. The on-going challenge for 
USCIS is to maintain the security of the immigration system while efficiently 
administering immigration benefits and services to eligible “customers.” USCIS needs to 
balance Goal 1 and Goal 2 effectively for it to be successful because in 2002, GAO had 
                                                 
11 One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/ (accessed November 2008), 7. 
12 Department of Homeland Security Delegation Memo 0150.1, Delegation to the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, section 2(I), Issue Date June 5, 2003. 
13 Department of Homeland Security Delegation Memo 7030.2, Delegation of Authority to the 
Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, section 2(I).  
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already found that INS had difficulties in providing immigration benefits in a timely 
manner while denying benefits to those who were not eligible.14 Past indications have 
shown that a wide variety of people from many different backgrounds engage in and 
entice others who are seeking a lawful immigration status in the U.S. to commit benefit 
fraud. The scope of the fraud schemes target many areas within the legal immigration 
system including but not limited to marriage, employment, religious worker, legalization, 
and asylum benefits. A number of examples that highlight the prevalence and scope of 
immigration benefit fraud are listed in the Appendix. Clearly, identifying and reducing 
immigration benefit fraud is an important part of the overall DHS strategy to ensure 
dangerous people and others who are committing fraud are not granted a legal status in 
the U.S.     
D.  IMMIGRATION AS A CORE ISSUE TO HOMELAND SECURITY; 
LEARNING FROM PAST PRACTICES ON BENEFIT FRAUD 
Immigration is a core homeland security issue for the federal, state and local 
governments throughout the U.S. as each are touched by immigration in negative and 
positive ways. While the U.S. administers a generous immigration program to assist with 
family reunification, trade, cultural endeavors such as the performing arts, and the 
economy, it also must ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system to identify 
national security, public safety threats and other fraudsters who might circumvent the 
legal immigration system. During the past couple of years, there has been a national 
debate on the need for comprehensive immigration reform, which primarily focused on 
providing border security to reduce illegal immigration while drastically increasing the 
legal immigration of foreign workers and humanely dealing with people who are 
currently living in the U.S. in an illegal status. Some would argue that the enforcement of 
immigration laws is vital to a comprehensive immigration reform program. Alternative 
points of view suggest that the new laws and programs enacted in the aftermath of 9/11 
                                                 
14 Government Accountability Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud, Focused Approach is Needed to 
Address Problems, GAO Report GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0266.pdf (accessed December 2008), 27. 
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are too restrictive and have created an anti-immigrant hysteria.15 Although, some think 
that the post 9/11 immigration enforcement policies have created a hostile environment 
toward illegal aliens by increasing worksite enforcement and apprehensions in residential 
homes and more involvement by state legislatures in charging aliens who are working 
illegally in the U.S. While there is room for a greater debate on how stringent a 
comprehensive immigration reform program might appear, there is little doubt that 
immigration benefit fraud needs to be part of the discussion since eligibility for the 
program will most likely draw people from other countries who will not readily qualify 
based on the merits of the program. As previous large-scale immigration programs from 
the 1980s have shown, comprehensive immigration reform has the potential to be fraught 
with fraud if it is not designed correctly from the outset.  
President Bush mentioned in his inaugural address that much work was 
accomplished in securing the border such as increasing worksite enforcement, deploying 
fences and advanced technologies to stop illegal crossings, and doubling the border 
agents.16 As recently as June 9, 2008, Secretary Chertoff made remarks at a State of 
Immigration Address where he also addressed the concept of comprehensive immigration 
reform. Secretary Chertoff emphasized three major areas: continued progress at the 
border, efforts to provide employers with better tools to maintain a legal workforce and 
efforts to strengthen and increase the efficiency of foreign temporary worker programs.17 
Secretary Chertoff also touted other familiar border metrics such as fences, hiring border 
patrol agents, and technology as part of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI).18 While a 
secure border is part of comprehensive immigration reform, it is only part of a 
prerequisite for a way forward national immigration strategy. The effective identification 
of immigration benefit fraud should also be a key contributor to comprehensive 
                                                 
15 Cheryl Little, “The War on Immigrants: Stories from the Front Lines,” Americas Quarterly 
(Summer 2008): 75. 
16 President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/immigration/ 
(accessed July 2008). 
17 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Department of Commerce 
Secretary Gutierrez at the State of Immigration Address, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1213101513448.shtm (accessed July 2008). 
18 Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm 
(accessed July 2008). 
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immigration reform. Immigration benefit fraud is vital to support an effective national 
immigration strategy because immigration benefits allow people to enter and reside 
lawfully in the U.S. For example, USCIS approves immigration benefits based on 
employment and marriage petitions that may lead to nonimmigrant or immigrant visas, 
which often permit entry into the U.S. or the ability to continue to reside lawfully in the 
U.S. People who obtain immigration benefits through fraudulent means can defeat 
physical assets such as fences, technology, and even additional border patrol agents. 
Criminal organizations also help facilitate immigration benefit fraud to circumvent 
increased border security.19 Lessons learned from past experiences suggest that as DHS 
becomes more effective in securing the U.S. border, people will use alternative means of 
entry such as immigration benefit fraud, which will undoubtedly put more pressure on 
USCIS to identify those who commit fraud and circumvent the legal immigration benefits 
system.20 Further, the last major amnesty in the 1980s was rife with immigration benefit 
fraud. In 1987, Mark W. Everson, Deputy Commissioner of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service said officials believed that more than half the farm worker 
applications in Florida alone contained fraudulent or untruthful statements.21 In 1989, a 
NY Times article described the 1986 amnesty program as “one of the most extensive 
immigration frauds ever perpetrated against the United States Government.”22 Therefore, 
it is important that DHS is optimally organized to both provide services to those who 
deserve immigration benefits, to identify and investigate those who pose a threat to the 
integrity of the legal immigration system and provide effective border security to reduce 
illegal immigration. This overarching concept supports the underlying notion of this 
thesis that effective immigration policy needs to be constructed in a way that involves a 
                                                 
19 Three Men Indicted on Alien Smuggling, Fraud, Conspiracy Charges, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_crm_747.html (accessed November 2008). 
20 William Branigin, “Immigration Fraud Schemes Proliferating Inside U.S.; With INS Focused on the 
Borders, Illegal Aliens Who Get Across Are `Home Free,' Officials Say,” The Washington Post, 
Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1997, Final Edition, A.04. 
21 Robert Pear, Special to the New York Times, “Wide Fraud Is Found among Illegal Aliens Who 
Seek Amnesty,” New York Times (1857-Current file), November 5, 1987, ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
(1851 - 2004), A1. 
22 Roberto Suro, Special to The New York Times, “False Migrant Claims: Fraud on a Huge Scale,” 
New York Times (1857-Current file), November 12, 1989, ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851 - 2004), 
1. 
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coordinated and collaborative effort between USCIS, ICE and CBP. Although the 
immigration components were divided along functional lines with the creation of DHS, 
effective immigration policy requires the close coordination of USCIS, ICE and CBP.   
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II.  IDENTIFYING KEY ISSUES TO AN EFFECTIVE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
A.  DISCUSSION ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND 
COLLABORATION 
This thesis will examine the current DHS immigration structure established after 
9/11 with a particular emphasis on the effects of organizational change and collaboration 
efforts between USCIS and ICE. One goal is to provide recommendations on future 
organizational change within the DHS immigration structure. It is hoped that the 
recommendations will also be applicable to other DHS components and other 
organizations with homeland security responsibilities that might undergo organizational 
change in the future. A second goal is to make recommendations to create a more 
effective immigration benefit fraud detection and investigative process that is now shared 
between USCIS and ICE rather than what previously existed under INS. The second goal 
will be accomplished by reviewing collaborative efforts between USCIS and ICE over 
the past five years since both DHS components share benefit fraud responsibilities. In 
seeking to understand better the effects of organizational change and collaborative efforts 
between USCIS and ICE, this thesis will emphasize the importance of immigration 
benefit fraud as a key area within homeland security.   
The primary questions to be answered will be: what effect did the reorganization 
of the immigration structure have on USCIS employees and how did the reorganization 
change their perceptions since the INS was abolished? This thesis will seek to determine 
any differences in perceptions from USCIS employees who were hired prior to and after 
2003, the year DHS was created. It will also seek to uncover organizational impediments 
to collaboration in the current USCIS and ICE structure that might be causing 
overlapping responsibilities and inefficiencies in areas. What solutions will make for a 
more effective structure for identifying and investigating immigration benefit fraud?  
Further study is needed to determine if the U.S. immigration system is optimally 
structured and is functioning effectively to identify, and where applicable, to assist in 
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prosecuting immigration fraud, now that immigration responsibilities have been dispersed 
over three DHS components; USCIS, ICE and CBP. USCIS and ICE have taken steps to 
identify and target immigration benefit fraud jointly.23 To date, USCIS is required to 
refer preliminary findings of fraud to ICE for further investigation. ICE can accept or 
decline the USCIS referral based on a number of discretionary reasons. However, there 
are still many questions regarding the lack of interoperability between ICE and USCIS 
concerning immigration fraud detection functions, mission overlap, redundancies, and 
information and data sharing challenges between a law enforcement entity (ICE) and a 
non-law enforcement entity such as USCIS. Additional study is needed to determine if 
there are other significant factors preventing both DHS components from seamlessly 
working together. 
This research will also seek to determine how trust affects each component’s 
mission when a law enforcement and non-law enforcement culture work collaboratively. 
To remedy some of these challenges, USCIS established the Fraud Detection and 
National Security (FDNS) unit to address immigration benefit fraud, national security and 
public safety risks within the legal immigration system.24,25 ICE also established a unit 
within its Office of Investigations that investigates immigration benefit fraud.26  
While it seems that USCIS and ICE have established specific organizational 
structures to work collaboratively and cooperatively, there may be gap in an 
understanding of the ICE mission by USCIS along with sharing key information 
concerning immigration benefit fraud between USCIS immigration officers and ICE 
special agents that is hampering successful collaboration. Current technological 
challenges may also be contributing to this gap. Further, USCIS and ICE have different 
                                                 
23 Office of Inspector General, Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process (Redacted-
Revised), OIG Report OIG-08-09 (Washington, D.C.: April 2008), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf (accessed November 2008), 5. 
24 Ibid., 1. 




26 ICE Identity and Benefits Fraud Branch, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/investigations/publicsafety/identityfraud.htm (accessed December 2008). 
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priorities, which can hamper how not only ICE investigates immigration fraud cases but 
how USCIS adjudicates cases. ICE investigates immigration benefit fraud and a myriad 
of other law enforcement categories that include child pornography, financial crimes, 
narcotics, weapons, and export crimes.27 USCIS is primarily a singularly focused DHS 
component concerned with administering the U.S. immigration and naturalization 
adjudication functions and establishing immigration service policies and procedures.28 
The difference in missions between USCIS and ICE may have created an organizational 
culture gap between USCIS and ICE employees. In addition, as noted in USCIS strategic 
goals one and two, USCIS must continue to balance the need for the timely adjudication 
of immigration benefits with detecting and identifying fraud within the immigration 
benefits system. On the other hand, ICE is a law enforcement entity and can focus solely 
on its law enforcement authorities within DHS. Traditionally, law enforcement cultures 
have not shared and partnered with non-law enforcement entities. Law enforcement 
cultures value and reward arrests, prosecutions and convictions.29 
Lastly, can USCIS effectively balance its dual mission of administering 
immigration benefits and ensuring the integrity of the legal immigration system? If so, 
how important is effective leadership to USCIS to those who adjudicate immigration 
benefits. As a DHS component, USCIS has partners within the law enforcement and 
intelligence community that have a strong interest in homeland security matters. USCIS 
also has a myriad of stakeholders on the customer service realm of its responsibilities that 
include community-based organizations, immigration advocacy groups and other special 
interest groups such as the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA).  
 
                                                 
27 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About Us, http://www.ice.gov/about/operations.htm 
(accessed February 2008). 




29 Christopher Thornlow, Fusing Intelligence with Law Enforcement Information: An Analytical 
Imperative (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 32. 
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B.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH IN IMPLEMENTING FUTURE 
CHANGE WITHIN DHS  
This thesis will strive to uncover some of the challenges and limitations that 
resulted from the reorganization of the U.S. immigration functions. The goal is to learn 
more about organizational change and how reorganizations shape employees’ perceptions 
on whether organizational change was either successful or unsuccessful. This research 
will also attempt to identify important new ways of thinking about how DHS can 
implement future organizational change to improve its effectiveness in indentifying and 
pursuing immigration benefit fraud within the U.S. legal immigration system. This 
research will seek to understand better the effects of organizational change on employees 
hired prior to a major restructuring as compared to those hired afterwards.  
This thesis will also strive to determine collaborative efforts between USCIS and 
ICE in the area of immigration benefit fraud detection. It will focus on perceptions of 
collaboration between USCIS and ICE and how effective that organizational relationship 
has been from a USCIS perspective. It will seek to learn more about the effects of 
immigration “boundaries” created in DHS and how that might affect USCIS and ICE 
collaboration in targeting immigration benefit fraud. Further, it will strive to uncover new 
ideas on how to implement more effectively successful collaborative efforts for agencies 
that have shared missions. Collaboration is vital to the overall mission of DHS; especially 
since it is comprised of 22 separate agencies. This research will seek to understand better 
the aspects of collaboration that may be applicable to other DHS components with similar 
missions.  
In order to learn more about the effects of organizational change and 
collaboration, a survey-based approach will focus on USCIS employees employed with 
INS and those who were recently hired under USCIS employed after 2003 with the 
creation of DHS. In essence, it will focus on those who lived through the change and 
those hired after the DHS reorganization.  
The primary audience for this research will be Congress, DHS, USCIS, ICE, CBP 
and academia who are interested in learning more about organizational change, 
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collaboration, and issues concerning immigration benefit fraud. The goal of this research 
will be to assist policy makers, DHS managers and employees who will gain a better 
understanding of organizational change and collaboration. It is hoped that this research 
can assist DHS to execute its immigration benefit fraud responsibilities more effectively 
among USCIS, ICE, and CBP through collaboration while being mindful of the effects of 
organizational change. This thesis will contribute to the growing body of literature 
surrounding immigration related issues and will provide critical research to identify 
USCIS and ICE collaborative efforts in targeting immigration benefit fraud. 
C. SURVEY METHODOLOGY ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND 
COLLABORATION 
In order to better understand the effects of organizational change from INS to the 
current state of the U.S. immigration benefits system and determine collaborative efforts 
between USCIS and ICE in ensuring the integrity of the immigration benefits system, an 
electronic survey questionnaire was sent to USCIS employees to obtain their insights and 
recommendations regarding organizational change and collaboration. The purpose of the 
survey research was to gauge employee perceptions on the effects of reorganizing the 
immigration functions within DHS with an emphasis on comparing USCIS and ICE with 
INS regarding the immigration benefits system, collaboration efforts between USCIS and 
ICE, and a general understanding of immigration issues and crossed organizational 
boundaries between USCIS and ICE.30 From June 2008 through July 2008, an electronic 
survey was administered to USCIS employees located throughout the U.S. in different 
organizational levels to obtain a sampling of Adjudications Officers, Immigration 
Officers, Intelligence Research Specialists, Supervisors and Managers. Survey 
participants were instructed that their responses would add to the general literature on 
leadership and organizational change to help identify new ways of thinking about how 
DHS can improve its organizational effectiveness, specifically in identifying and 
pursuing immigration benefit fraud within the U.S. legal immigration system. 
Adjudications Officers were selected because they determine eligibility for a wide range 
                                                 
30 An electronic survey was submitted to ICE; however, an insufficient response was received to 
support any findings. 
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of immigration benefits under the purview of USCIS. Immigration Officers and 
Intelligence Research Specialists were chosen because they are primarily concerned with 
identifying immigration fraud and collaborating with ICE on benefit fraud 
investigations.31 Supervisors and managers were selected since they are responsible for 
providing leadership and direction to Adjudication Officers and Immigration Officers 
while also playing a vital role in effectively executing organizational change. The entire 
sample of USCIS personnel is comprised of 265 personnel of which 144 were male and 
121 were female. For occupational type, 147 were Adjudications Officers, 60 were 
USCIS Supervisors/Managers/Executives, 41 were Immigration Officers, and 17 were 
Intelligence Research Specialists.  
From an organizational standpoint, eight were from USCIS HQ, 78 were from 
USCIS Service Centers, 39 were from the National Benefits Center, eight were from the 
Regional Offices, and 132 were from USCIS District or Field Offices.  
 











Figure 2.1. Representation of USCIS Occupations from the Survey 
 
                                                 




















Figure 2.2. Representation of USCIS Organizational Divisions from the Survey 
As background, USCIS has four Regional Offices that provide oversight and 
guidance to the USCIS District and Field Offices. USCIS has District and Field Offices 
located throughout the U.S. where applicants are typically interviewed for immigration 
benefits such as adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and naturalization. 
The District and Field Offices are unique in that they have “face to face” contact with 
aliens seeking immigration benefits. There are four USCIS Service Centers located in 
CA, NE, TX, and VT where immigration petitions that do not typically require an 
interview are adjudicated by a USCIS Adjudications Officer. The National Benefits 
Center serves as the processing hub for immigration petitions and applications that 
normally require an interview at a USCIS District of Field Office. 
A 5-point Likert-type response scale was used in the survey: (a) Strongly Agree, 
(b) Agree, (c) Neither Agree Nor Disagree, (d) Disagree, (e) Strongly Disagree and on 
some questions “I don’t know” was used as a response option to measure perceptions on 
organizational change and collaboration. A variety of open ended questions were also 
provided in the survey to elicit additional details on organizational issues concerning 
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immigration, collaboration with ICE and USCIS, and the effect on the adjudication of 
immigration benefits within the new DHS structure. There were also a few survey 
questions that contained multiple answers that were recommended by this writer along 
with a fill in the blank section to elicit answers directly from the respondents. This was 
particularly valuable in analyzing some of the variables that have hindered and aided 
successful past collaborative efforts on immigration benefit fraud between USCIS and 
ICE.  
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III.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A.  DEFINING THE KEY CHALLENGES THAT WERE INHERENT TO INS 
To obtain a better understanding of what led to the current organizational 
structure of USCIS, ICE and CBP, it is necessary to review the literature from the late 
1990s and early 2000s, which suggests that INS was somewhat lacking in its attempt to 
manage its adjudications (service) and criminal investigation (law enforcement) functions 
simultaneously. In 1990, Congress established special immigrant and nonimmigrant 
categories for religious workers based on perceived shortages of religious personnel in 
the U.S. In 1999, GAO identified concerns in the religious worker visa program in a 
report entitled, Visa Issuance Issues Concerning the Religious Worker Visa Program. 
GAO questioned if INS adjudicators had access to a sufficient amount of the available 
evidence to determine eligibility of a prospective religious worker. GAO also identified 
that INS lacked sufficient knowledge of the extent of the fraud in the religious worker 
program and was unable to quantify accurately fraud within the religious worker 
category. INS suggested a number of ways to address the GAO findings that included 
additional documentary evidence to support the religious worker petition and use of 
commercial software to identify trends and patterns more effectively that might suggest 
fraud. It was hoped that the additional documentary evidence would enable adjudicators 
to make more informed decisions and also to deter unqualified applicants from filing for 
benefits under the religious worker category. 
As part of its commitment to address some of the vulnerabilities within the legal 
immigration system, USCIS initiated a Benefit Fraud Assessment (BFA) to quantify the 
fraud rates within the I-360 Religious Worker program. The USCIS Office of Fraud 
Detection and National Security Religious Worker Benefit Fraud Assessment Summary is 
a subtopic from the literature that summarizes the fraud rate within the religious worker 
program. The assessment indicates that FDNS officers conducted field inquiries at the 
petitioners’ locations to determine if the entity was a viable organization and if there was 
a viable offer of employment. The results of the BFA were published in July 2006, which 
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indicated a 32% fraud rate within the religious worker program.32 The literature further 
claimed that the high fraud rate supported previous perceptions and that USCIS would 
work collaboratively with ICE and Department of State to combat fraud. This initial 
study suggests that USCIS is on the right path in developing quantifiable fraud rates on 
immigration petitions and developing methods to address areas that have been prone to 
fraud.   
Next, GAO’s main argument in Immigration Benefit Fraud, Focused Approach Is 
Needed to Address Problems focused on INS’ lack of an effective immigration benefit 
fraud strategy, which included a lack of policy, case tracking and information sharing 
guidance. Further, GAO identified that INS adjudicators focused on and were rewarded 
for the number of applications reviewed, not the quality of the review.33 Some 
adjudicators told GAO investigators that because of the pressure to adjudicate cases 
quickly, they did not routinely use investigations staff to look into potentially fraudulent 
applications: doing so would take more time and reduce the number of applications they 
could review. INS investigators following up on approved applications found instances of 
fraud.34 The GAO literature suggests that INS had difficulty in balancing its adjudication 
and fraud detection responsibilities.  
In addition to the lack of a coherent benefit fraud strategy, INS was also 
hampered with a dual responsibility in adjudicating immigration benefits in a timely 
manner to those who were legally entitled to them and to deny benefits to those who were 
not eligible.35 From 1994 through 2000, backlogs (i.e., pending applications) increased  
 
 
                                                 
32 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Office of Fraud Detection and National Security 
Religious Worker Benefit Fraud Assessment Summary, July 2006, 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Relig_Worker_Fraud_Jul06.pdf (accessed November 2007), 2. 
33 Government Accountability Office, H1-B Foreign Workers: Better Controls Needed to Help 
Employers and Protect Workers, GAO Report GAO/HEHS-00-157 (Washington, D.C.: September 7, 
2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00157.pdf (accessed December 2008). 
34 Government Accountability Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud, Focused Approach is Needed to 
Address Problems, GAO Report GAO-02-66 (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0266.pdf (accessed December 2008). 
35 Ibid. 
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from 1 million to 4 million. INS faced criticism in two competing directions: not 
adjudicating cases fast enough and not having an adequate structure in place to identify 
immigration fraud.36  
A majority of the literature reviewed was critical of INS; however, there were a 
number of proposals offered on how to reorganize the immigration structure. After 9/11, 
Congress concluded that INS was not capable in its current structure to investigate 
criminal aliens and terrorists who utilized the U.S. legal immigration system in 
furtherance of criminal activity and caused untold damage to the U.S. economy, 
infrastructure and its citizens. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States noted terrorists exploited immigration border and benefit policies 
throughout the 1990s and that there was a need for INS to prevent terrorist abuse of the 
immigration system.37 Further, the importance of targeting immigration benefit fraud and 
having an effective strategy was underscored in a report by Janice Kephart who was a 
former counsel to the September 11 Commission. She analyzed the immigration history 
of 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the United States from the early 1990s to 
2004 and found that nearly two-thirds (59) committed immigration fraud prior to and in 
conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity.38 Kephart’s article, which was titled 
Immigration and Terrorism Moving beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, 
focused on the connection between U.S. immigration fraud and terrorism from the early 
1990s until 2004.  
B.  ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES ON DIVIDING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION 
STRUCTURE ALONG FUNCTIONAL LINES 
In 2003, INS was abolished and its immigration functions were transferred into 
USCIS, ICE and CBP. USCIS was tasked with administering legal immigration benefits, 
                                                 
36 Government Accountability Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud, Focused Approach is Needed to 
Address Problems, GAO Report GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0266.pdf (accessed September 2007). 
37 9/11 And Terrorist Travel A Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (Franklin, TN: Hillsboro Press, 2004), 102. 
38 Janice L. Kephart, “Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist 
Travel,” Center for Immigration Studies, Center Paper 24 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration 
Studies, 2005), http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.pdf (accessed November 2007). 
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ICE was tasked with investigating immigration and customs violations within the U.S. 
and CBP was responsible for border protection and inspection duties at U.S. airports, 
seaports and land ports of entry. The latest reorganization is one of many that has 
occurred since 1891. The literature indicates that the U.S. immigration system has been 
restructured and reorganized into many federal departments since its inception in 1891 as 
noted by Sharon Barrios in “Inside the Immigration and Naturalization Service: The 
Organizational Dynamics of a Problem Agency.” Even INS has had a lengthy history of 
organizational changes since its creation in 1933. 
Now, five years after the creation of DHS the literature is still unclear on the 
success of splitting the immigration functions into three separate agencies. There are 
concerns that the immigration responsibilities in the DHS are not functioning effectively. 
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced a “Second Stage Review” (2SR) in 2005 that 
included strengthening border security and interior enforcement and reforming 
immigration processes as major agenda items. Currently, three agencies in DHS have 
important immigration functions: USCIS, ICE and CBP.39 In addition to the concerns 
over the integration of ICE and CBP and their roles in abating illegal immigration, there 
is a reported lack of coordination between USCIS and ICE in the area of fraud and 
national security investigations.40  
According to a scholarly perspective by Thomas Donovan, additional questions 
were also raised concerning placing the immigration services (benefits) portion of INS 
into DHS. The primary mission of DHS is to fight terrorism, and providing good service 
to clients may be incidental. One of USCIS’ goals is to serve the immigrant community 
effectively, efficiently, and fairly, while avoiding the problems and deserved criticisms of 
its predecessor organization.41 USCIS is expected to achieve this goal under the 
                                                 
39 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Toward More Effective Immigration Policies: Selected Organizational Issues, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RL33319), Summary, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1623.pdf (accessed September 2007). 
40 Ibid., 27. 
41 Goal 2: Provide Effective Customer-Oriented Immigration Benefit and Information Services, 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/goal2.pdf (accessed August 2008). 
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administrative authority of DHS that has goals that may not be compatible.42 This 
suggests an important point because the new mandate for DHS was to reduce 
vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural 
disasters. This could potentially be a dilemma for USCIS as it must continually balance 
providing efficient customer service with maintaining a secure legal immigration 
system.43 In addition, by placing USCIS within DHS, USCIS’s goal to build trust with its 
clients may be seriously hampered since it is based within an organization specifically 
designed to combat terrorism. A recurring problem was that the clients of the 
immigration service, the applicants themselves, tended to be distrustful and guarded.44 
However, while USCIS is primarily charged with providing good service to customers, it 
also is a valuable resource to the DHS community because it is responsible for 
identifying fraud and national security threats within the legal immigration system. 
USCIS is also uniquely positioned to develop immigration benefit fraud leads and 
uncover emerging homeland security threats during its adjudication and interview 
process. How would benefit fraud leads developed by USCIS be transferred to ICE for 
further investigation if USCIS and ICE resided in different departments? Even today, ICE 
and USCIS are in DHS and there is room for improvement in information sharing and 
feedback regarding benefit fraud investigations.  
Donovan seems to focus mainly on how applicants react with a perceived fear to 
USCIS being placed in DHS and fails to address how effectively USCIS and ICE 
collaborate on benefit fraud investigations to maintain the integrity of the U.S. 
immigration system. As Donovan notes, otherwise USCIS would be more appropriately 
placed within the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor or  
 
                                                 
42 Thomas Donovan, The American Immigration System: A Structural Change with a Different 
Emphasis (Oxford University Press, 2005), 574. 
43 Mission Statement of the Department of Homeland Security, D.C., 2002, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm (accessed February 2008).  
44 B. Hendrix, “Government’s Crackdown on Immigrants Post 9/11 Creates Climate of Fear, Not 
Security, Press Release of the American Immigration,” Lawyers’ Association, November 19, 2003. 
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even back in the Department of Justice.45 Although Donovan makes a compelling case, 
he remains silent on the issue of immigration benefit fraud and how identifying fraud is a 
responsibility intertwined between USCIS, ICE and CBP.  
Some literature also suggests management challenges in clear guidance on roles 
and responsibilities between USCIS and ICE regarding immigration benefit fraud.46 
Many of the same challenges such as an effective strategy and roles and responsibilities 
involving immigration benefit fraud were carried over from INS into USCIS and ICE. 
According to a CRS Report for Congress Immigration Fraud: Policies, Investigations 
and Issues from May 2007, it was believed that ICE would inherit the benefit fraud and 
investigation responsibilities from INS. However, when USCIS and ICE were created, 
each was charged with immigration benefit fraud responsibilities. The CRS report further 
identifies communication challenges between USCIS and ICE in addressing benefit fraud 
but clarifies that a memorandum of agreement has been established to improve 
communication. Lastly, the CRS report indicates that USCIS established the Office of 
Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) to identify benefit fraud, perform as 
USCIS’ liaison to the law enforcement and intelligence community, and identify 
vulnerabilities that compromised the integrity of the legal immigration system.  
In “Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of the INS,” Jeffrey 
Manns contends that politicians sometimes tout the reorganization of federal departments 
as substantive, effective change while under close scrutiny it appears that the underlying 
problems which led to the need for change were not adequately addressed.47 Manns 
raises an important question because the U.S. immigration structure has been reorganized 
at least seven times since 1891 when Congress adopted the Immigration Act of 1891 (26 
Stat. 1084), creating the Office of Immigration. Can we be confident that the U.S. 
immigration structure was optimized during the latest restructure into DHS? Manns 
                                                 
45 Thomas Donovan, The American Immigration System: A Structural Change with a Different 
Emphasis (Oxford University Press, 2005), 581. 
46 Homeland Security Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs, 
(GAO Report GAO-05-81) 25, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0581.pdf (accessed November 2007). 
47 Jeffrey Manns, “Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of the INS,” The Yale 
Law Journal 1, (October 2002): 150. 
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briefly reviews five proposals from 2002 to reorganize the INS and he provided 
comments on the negative and potential benefits of each plan. The closest proposal to the 
current USCIS and ICE environment mentioned in the article describes how INS’s 
enforcement functions and service functions should be split and reorganized along 
functional lines.48 Manns is critical of the simplicity of dividing the immigration 
enforcement and service functions and he is skeptical on whether this will enhance 
communication and accountability.49 He also cites Glenn A. Fine, the DOJ Inspector 
General who argued that separating the INS into two parts “might merely compound the 
deficiencies in the agency’s management controls, systems and accountability.”50 In 
“Inside The Immigration and Naturalization Service: The Organizational Dynamics of a 
Problem Agency,” Sharon Barrios noted that these functions (benefit services and law 
enforcement) are interconnected and interdependent, and separating them into two or 
more different agencies may, in fact, exacerbate the problem of coordinating service and 
enforcement paperwork.51 She further concludes from her review of the 1997 U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform recommendations that dividing the immigration 
functions into separate agencies does little to solve the inherent complexities of the 
immigration issue simply because functions are divided between agencies rather than 
under one organizational component.52 Further, the immigration functions were actually 
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The overall theme of Mann’s article suggests that a successful reorganization is 
difficult at best and politicians should be wary of quick fixes to the U.S. immigration 
structure. However, Manns does not go into detail concerning the best avenues for 
restructuring the immigration system. Rather, he suggests that focusing on immigration 
policy is more effective than a restructuring plan.  
There is also literature on organizational questions regarding USCIS and ICE 
concerning immigration fraud.53 Ruth Wasem mentions a few of the key questions in the 
2007 Congressional Research Services report, Toward More Effective Immigration 
Policies: Selected Organizational Issues. 
• Should USCIS have a formal enforcement arm to investigate benefit fraud 
and other adjudications-related violations? 
• Is communication and coordination among CBP, ICE, and USCIS facile 
and efficient? 
• Would any substantial reorganization of immigration functions- no matter 
how optimal- be too disruptive to be prudent at this time? 
Policy questions concerning these key issues were discussed by the U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration during 2005. 
C.  APPLYING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORY TO MORE 
EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZE HOMELAND SECURITY STRUCTURES  
There is extensive literature available concerning organizational architecture. 
David Nadler and Michael Tushman, who are renowned experts on organizational change 
and executive leadership, assert in Organizational Architecture: Designs for Changing 
Organizations that there is really no best way to organize work processes. However, they 
suggest that leaders must consider two questions; how the new architecture will enable 
the organization to execute its strategies and how will it fit or impact the individuals who 
                                                 
53 For a discussion of these policy questions, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary 
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work for the organization.54 Nadler and Tushman warn leaders to think about designing 
organizations from a strategy/task performance and social/cultural perspective. They 
argue that both need to be balanced to design an effective organization. If only 
strategy/task is considered, organizations will be created that look effective but do not 
function effectively or create new problems. If only a social/cultural perspective is 
considered, employees will be satisfied but the organization will most likely be 
ineffective in executing its strategies. 
Nadler and Tushman offer another salient point by stating that changes in one 
component of an organization frequently have repercussions for other components 
because the parts are interconnected. This rings true for many of the mergers and 
reorganizations that occurred with the creation of DHS to include reorganizing the U.S. 
immigration system. By stripping out the immigration functions from one agency (INS) 
and dividing the functions across USCIS, ICE, CBP, immigration functions once 
interconnected now became disconnected between three DHS components. Nadler and 
Tushman also discuss an important concept called the congruence model of 
organizational behavior, which is based on the degree to which components fit together: 
the congruence among the components or in another words and how well components of 
an organization interact or effectively function together.55 In the case of this research, 
how well do two DHS components such as USCIS and ICE interact and share 
responsibility to ensure the integrity of the legal immigration system?  
In “An Introduction to Organizational Design,” Michael B. McCaskey discusses 
two patterns relating to organizational design; mechanistic which is efficient and 
predictable and organic where demands in the task environment are ambiguously defined 
and decision-making is more decentralized. McCaskey suggests that neither method is 
necessarily superior to the other but the choice of the most appropriate form is contingent 
                                                 
54 David Nadler, Marc S. Gerstein and Robert B. Shaw, Organizational Architecture: Designs for 
Changing Organizations, 1st ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 284. 
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upon the task and people involved.56 A mechanistic approach would be more suited to an 
organization where roles and procedures are clearly defined and the organizational 
culture is accustomed in working in a routinized environment. An organic approach is 
designed to be an open system that can take advantage of new opportunities and is 
adaptable to change. It is decentralized and is supported by an organizational culture that 
prefers variety and uncertainty. 
Next, McCaskey discusses the concept of differentiation, which is described as 
the creation or emergence of differences in an organization. This can occur in the 
organizational structure in several ways such as the following. 
• vertically – into levels 
• horizontally – into sections, departments, divisions, and so on 
• division of labor – occupational roles 
• patterns of thinking – differences between units, in members’ goals, time, 
and interpersonal orientations57 
Integration is another important idea mentioned by McCaskey because at the 
same time the organization is differentiated to work more effectively on tasks, some 
activities of organizational units must be brought back together, or integrated.58 
Differentiation and integration are key to understanding what was considered when the 
U.S. immigration functions were “differentiated” after 9/11 and whether sufficient 
planning was set aside to think about how some of the immigration functions should be 
“integrated” across USCIS, ICE and CBP. McCaskey warns that a manager/designer 
must be careful in differentiating the organization too radically, the greater the 
differences between units, the harder it is for them to coordinate activities with each other 
and the chances for misunderstandings increase in a highly differentiated organization.59  
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One could infer that has led to some of the operational challenges between other 
immigration components within DHS such as ICE (investigations) and CBP (border 
security/inspections).60  
Next, structural changes of organizations, which occurred with the creation of 
DHS do not necessarily result in employee understanding of the changes. As Nadler and 
Tushman indicated earlier, social/cultural perspectives need to be considered as well as 
strategy/task performance. J. Duane Hoover also suggests in “Cognitive Mapping and 
Diagnostic Aspects of Organizational Change” that successful change management and 
the creation of Perceptual Actualization is part of the following criteria. 
• When I see it manifested in organizations and work groups 
• When I experience it myself, on a personal level 
• When my organizations, clients, customers, etc., re-package it in their own 
terms as their felt experience 
• When that experience can be reported back as feedback or registered as 
lasting change by the participants61 
Organizational change can be stressful for employees; especially those that have 
limited influence on the outcome of a company or federal agency merger. Further, 
Hoover suggests that a number of important factors need to be considered on an 
intellectual, emotional, behavioral and perceptual level to implement effective 
organizational change.62 For example, an employee must have an understanding of the 
organizational change, internalize it, demonstrate behaviors that reinforce the 
understanding, and then integrate all three to actualize the change successfully. This 
literature describes in detail how to focus an organization’s efforts on people in 
implementing change, rather than on the reorganization of work or services along 
functional lines.  
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D.  HOW LEADERSHIP EFFECTS ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
There is an abundance of literature on the importance of leadership and 
management practices to implement organizational change effectively. Some scholars 
contend that leadership and management are mutually exclusive roles that require 
different people to be performed successfully, while others argue that both roles can be 
effectively performed by one person.63 This concept is critical for a DHS component 
such as USCIS because it must continually balance its customer service and homeland 
security functions that can, at times, be fundamentally at odds with each other. Gary Yukl 
and Richard Lepsinger suggest in “Why Integrating the Leading and Managing Roles Is 
Essential for Organizational Effectiveness” that it is important to strike a balance between 
adaptation versus efficiency. Adaptation can enable an organization to seek new 
opportunities to enhance innovation while efficiency focuses on rules, procedures and 
elaborate control mechanisms.64 Integrating management and leadership concepts is 
referred to as a flexible leadership model and is applicable to leaders who tackle complex 
problems within homeland security that cross many horizontal and vertical organizational 
levels. The authors refer to “systems thinking” as a way to understand complex problems 
that may have included actions taken earlier to solve other problems and now have 
created new ones.65 Lastly, it is also suggested that “… a coordinated effort by leaders at 
all levels in the organization is necessary to ensure that a program or management system 
is effectively implemented.”66 This is also an important concept for USCIS in that 
balancing its dual mission must flow from its senior leadership to its first line supervisory 
ranks to throughout the organization. How has USCIS embedded the importance of 
productivity and homeland security functions throughout the organization and has it been 
successful?  
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The literature on transformational change also appears to be applicable to DHS 
and USCIS. Transformational change can be characterized by revolutionary structural 
and procedural changes, as well as radical shifts in business strategy, which can affect the 
entire organization.67 In The “Role of Leadership during Large Scale Organization 
Transitions: Lessons from Six Empirical Studies,” it is suggested that leadership plays an 
important role on the success or failure of change. Further, the impact of employees on 
organizational change outcomes must not be underestimated before engaging in 
transformational change.68 Most of the literature on the creation of USCIS, ICE and CBP 
focused on the functional elements of immigration responsibilities, rather than including 
an impact assessment on how employees would react to the changes that would 
ultimately determine the success or failure of the new organization. While the research 
compared in “The Role of Leadership During Large Scale Organization Transitions: 
Lessons from Six Empirical Studies” is somewhat limited as the majority of the findings 
were gleaned from Australia, there are some common sense approach recommendations 
such as overcoming resistance to organizational change that can be learned from the 
comparative studies. A common theme from the six studies stressed that transformational 
leadership has an advantage in communication and building trust with employees than 
coercive or directive-only leadership in implementing large-scale change. The research 
suggests that the impact of organizational change on employees should not be 
underestimated as they are the backbone of the organization and will ultimately 
determine the success or failure of the change.69  
E.  CONCLUSION  
A number of literature examples provide information on the lack of a benefit 
fraud strategy in INS. There are also numerous reports on USCIS and ICE organizational 
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challenges in jointly targeting benefit fraud, and USCIS’ new role as a service oriented 
agency with an on-going responsibility to provide customer service yet also detect 
immigration benefit fraud.  
The literature suggests that immigration reform has generated a lot of interest 
among academics, Congress, and important immigrant advocacy groups. Some literature 
suggests overarching issues such as the dispersal of immigration functions across three 
agencies within DHS means that no one person is responsible for immigration policy and 
operations in a clear chain of command.70 The recent literature has identified potential 
organizational issues between ICE and USCIS but is lacking an analysis or study of 
organizational change on USCIS employees since the creation of DHS. The literature is 
also unclear as to how the three DHS components which have immigration 
responsibilities can effectively work together to administer immigration benefits while 
also ensuring that law enforcement and U.S. security interests are met. The literature also 
fails to provide solutions on how USCIS, ICE and CBP can collaborate and from a more 
strategic viewpoint, to organize the immigration benefit fraud responsibilities effectively 
within the three DHS components when each seems to have their own set of priorities 
and missions. 
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IV.  FINDINGS ON THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE AND COLLABORATION 
A.  SURVEY RESULTS COMPARING THE NEW DHS IMMIGRATION 
STRUCTURE TO INS 
In order to elicit results regarding perceptions on organizational alignment and 
change, USCIS personnel were provided with information regarding the transition of 
immigration responsibilities from INS to USCIS, ICE, and CBP. One of the first 
questions to determine employees’ perceptions on organizational change focused on 
immigration enforcement under the current structure and comparing it to INS. Effective 
immigration enforcement was one of the cornerstones of restructuring the U.S. 
immigration system. The survey participants were asked to respond to the following 
statement: From my perspective as a member of USCIS, immigration enforcement is 
working more effectively under ICE than the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS). 
The results from all USCIS participants indicated that 34% combined to disagree 
or strongly disagree that immigration enforcement was working more effectively under 
ICE than INS while 27% combined to agree and strongly agree. Most interestingly, 25% 
neither agreed nor disagreed that immigration enforcement is working more effectively 
under ICE and 14% indicated that they did not know if ICE was more effective. After 5 
years since the creation of DHS and the reorganization of the U.S. immigration system, 
only a little more than a quarter of the participants felt generally positive about ICE’s 
efforts regarding immigration enforcement as compared to INS. Could resistance to 
organizational change be influencing perceptions on the effectiveness of immigration 
enforcement in the new DHS structure? 
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Figure 4.1. Results of all USCIS Survey Participants 
Next, the survey participants were asked to respond to the following statement: 
Separating the immigration functions into USCIS, ICE and CBP has enhanced the 
integrity of the legal immigration system and made it more secure than what previously 
existed under the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
The results from all USCIS participants in Figure 4.2 indicated that 42% 
combined to disagree and strongly disagree that separating the functions made the legal 
immigration system more secure while 28% combined to agree and disagree, 21% neither 
agreed nor disagreed and 9% did not know if separating the functions made the legal 
immigration system more secure. It is interesting that the survey data is nearly identical 
from agree (22%), neither agree nor disagree (21%), disagree (21%) and strongly 
disagree (21%). What could be causing similar percentages across a number of response 
choices when it was believed that abolishing INS and separating the immigration 
functions such as benefits, investigations, and border security was supposed to have been 






























Separating the Immigration Functions into USCIS, ICE, and CBP has Enhanced 
the Integrity of the Legal Immigration System as Compared to INS
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Figure 4.2. Results of all USCIS Survey Participants 
The following two figures (4.3 and 4.4) show a continued negative perception on 
the notion that it was a good idea to separate the immigration functions and that due to 
the complexities of the U.S. immigration system, it is more effective to continue with the 
current DHS structure. The survey participants were asked to respond to the following 
statements: As a member of USCIS, I think it was a good idea to separate the 
enforcement, border security and immigration benefits functions into three distinct DHS 














It was a Good Idea to Separate the Enforcement, Border Security and 
Immigration Benefits Functions into 3 Distinct DHS Components 
(USCIS, ICE and CBP) 
 
Figure 4.3. Results of all USCIS Survey Participants 
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Because of the complexities of the U.S. immigration system (administering 
benefits, enforcement and border security), it is more effective to continue with the 
current USCIS, ICE and CBP structure in order for each DHS component to focus on 
their individual immigration responsibilities such as administering immigration benefits, 
















Due to the Complexity of the Immigration System, It is More Effective to Keep the 
Immigration Functions Separate 
 
Figure 4.4. Results of all USCIS Survey Participants 
In order to look deeper into the effects on organizational change, the data were 
further analyzed to reveal any differences between survey participants who were 
employed by INS (pre-2003) and those that were hired by USCIS (post-2003). Further 
analysis revealed that those employees who were hired pre-2003 were more likely to 
have a negative perception on the new DHS immigration structure as compared to INS. 
Not surprisingly, 28% of the post-2003 hires answered “I Don’t know” as compared to 
only 9% of the pre-2003 hires in response to the statement that immigration enforcement 
is more effective under ICE than INS. It is logical that more of the post-2003 hires might 
not have experience working with or have knowledge of INS enforcement activity since 
being hired into the new DHS structure. The same could be argued for 21% of the post-
2003 hires who answered “I Don’t know” as compared to only 5% of the pre-2003 hires 
in response to the statement that separating the immigration functions has enhanced the 


























Figure 4.5. Survey Results on USCIS Participants Who were Hired Pre-2003 and 
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Figure 4.6 Survey Results on USCIS Participants Who were Hired Pre-2003 and 
Post-2003: Comparing Their Perceptions on Separating the Immigration 
Functions 
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In order to reduce a direct comparison bias to INS and the current DHS 
immigration structure, survey participants were asked to respond to the following 
statement: As a member of USCIS, I think it was a good idea to separate the enforcement, 
border security and immigration benefits functions into three distinct DHS components 
(USCIS, ICE and CBP). 
The survey results continued to show that the pre-2003 sample had a higher 
percentage response rate in the strongly disagree and disagree categories while the post-
2003 sample had a higher response rate in the strongly agree and agree categories. From 
the pre-2003 sample, 55% had combined to strongly disagree or disagree while only 37% 


















It was a Good Idea to Separate the Enforcement, Border Security and Immigration Benefits 




Figure 4.7. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel Who were Hired Pre-2003 and Post-
2003: Comparing Their Perceptions on if It was a Good Idea to Separate 
the Immigration Functions  
Although not as remarkable on a percentage basis between the pre-2003 and post-
2003 sample group, the bias pattern continued on perceptions that due to the complexity 
of the immigration system, it is more effective to keep the immigration functions 
separate.  
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Because of the complexities of the U.S. immigration system (administering 
benefits, enforcement and border security), it is more effective to continue with the 
current USCIS, ICE and CBP structure in order for each DHS component to focus on 
their individual immigration responsibilities such as administering immigration benefits, 
enforcing immigration laws and providing border security. 
In keeping with the established pattern, the pre-2003 sample had a higher, 
combined percentage response rate (48%) in the strongly disagree and disagree categories 
while the post-2003 sample had a higher, combined response rate (38%) in the strongly 
























Figure 4.8. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel Who were Hired Pre-2003 and Post-
2003: Comparing Their Perceptions on Why It is More Effective to Keep 
the Immigration Functions Separate 
B.  SURVEY RESULTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE 
LEADERSHIP AND QUALITY AS A CONCERN TO ADJUDICATIVE 
DECISIONS 
Leadership to build internal and external support for organizational change was 
considered an important aspect in much of the literature reviewed in support of this 
thesis. One of the main goals of restructuring the U.S. immigration system was to create a 
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climate where immigration benefits were administered more efficiently and effectively as 
compared to INS. The large-scale organizational change may have affected perceptions 
on the role of effective leadership and the quality of adjudicative decisions. In order to 
elicit perceptions on effective leadership and the importance of quality in the adjudicative 
process, survey participants were asked to respond to the following statements. In 
addition to the 5 point Likert-type scale, an additional choice of “Not Applicable – I don’t 
adjudicate immigration petitions and applications” was utilized to obtain more focused 
results from those participants who actually adjudicated immigration benefits within 
USCIS. The survey participants were asked to respond to the following statements. See 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10. Effective leadership plays an important role in formulating how I 
make decisions and use my discretion in making adjudicative decisions on immigration 
petitions and applications and When I adjudicate immigration petitions and applications, 
my main concern is the quality of the adjudicative decision. 
On the role of effective leadership, 79% of the pre-2003 sample had combined to 
strongly agree or agree while only 13% combined to strongly disagree or disagree and 
8% of the sample held a neutral perception. From the post-2003 sample, 82% combined 
to strongly agree or agree while only 8% combined to strongly disagree or disagree and 
10% held a neutral perception. The results also showed that a significant number of 
participants perceived that their main concern was the quality of the adjudicative decision 
as 94% of the pre-2003 sample combined to strongly agree or agree while only 3% 
combined to strongly disagree or disagree. From the post-2003 sample, 96% combined to 
strongly agree or agree while only 2% combined to strongly disagree or disagree and 3% 
held a neutral perception. As compared to other perceptions concerning the separation of 
the immigration functions, the results between the pre-2003 and post-2003 groups were 
nearly identical. 
The results of the survey indicated surprisingly similar results in perceptions 
between the pre-2003 and post-2003 hires when it came to the role of effective leadership 




Despite the large-scale change, the results demonstrate the importance of leadership and 
that quality is central to the adjudicative decision process, which is what the planners of 



























Figure 4.9. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel Who were Hired Pre-2003 and Post-






















Figure 4.10. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel Who were Hired Pre-2003 and Post-
2003: Comparing Their Perceptions that Quality is the Main Concern 
When Making Adjudicative Decisions 
 44
C.  SURVEY RESULTS COMPARING SUPERVISORS/MANAGERS WITH 
NON-SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES  
The survey data was also reviewed to discover perceptions between 
supervisor/managers and non supervisor/managers such as Adjudications Officers, 
Immigration Officers and Intelligence Research Specialists. What effect would those 
differences have on the effectiveness of USCIS? Will organizational change positively or 
negatively affect an organization like USCIS if there are differences in perception based 
on position levels with an organization such as USCIS? The following survey results are 
based on the perception differences between those who are supervisors/managers and 

























Figure 4.11. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel between Those Who Are and Are Not 



















Separating the Immigration Functions into USCIS, ICE, and CBP has Enhanced the 





Figure 4.12. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel between Those Who Are and Are Not 


















It was a Good Idea to Separate the Enforcement, Border Security and Immigration Benefits 





Figure 4.13. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel between Those Who Are and Are Not 
Supervisors: Comparing Their Perceptions on Whether It was a Good Idea 
























Figure 4.14. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel between Those Who Are and Are Not 
Supervisors: Comparing Their Perceptions on Why It is More Important to 
Keep the Immigration Functions Separate 
In general, many similarities in the survey data between those who are and are not 
supervisors/managers appeared. What implications might this have for future 
organizational and technological change within USCIS? While senior leadership plays an 
important role in facilitating organizational change, first-line supervisors also play a key 
role in communicating the need for change and emphasizing the need for the acceptance 
of organizational change. Prior research has shown that the leadership’s ability to gain 
support of the change from employees is a key determinant in the success or failure of 
change.71 Figure 4.15 illustrates some of the differences in the data sample between those 
who are and are not supervisors/managers. Figure 4.15 provides information on the year 
each entered on duty with USCIS and INS and the number who entered on duty each 
year.  
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Figure 4.15. Results of the Frequency of Supervisors and Non Supervisors by Year of 
USCIS Personnel Who Participated in the Survey 
D.  PERCEPTIONS ON ALIGNMENT TO SUPPORT COLLABORATION 
The survey data provided opportunities to review perceptions on collaborative 
efforts between USCIS and ICE from a USCIS perspective. Each participant was asked to 
respond to the following statement, which sought to determine if USCIS and ICE were 
more effectively aligned to foster collaboration in ensuring the integrity of the U.S. legal 
immigration system than what previously existed when all of the immigration functions 
were located within INS: When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was 
abolished in 2003, the U.S. immigration functions were divided into 3 DHS components. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services was given the responsibility to administer the 
legal immigration system, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was given the 
responsibility of enforcing U.S. immigration laws, and Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) was given the responsibility of protecting the U.S. borders and inspecting 
travelers and cargo that entered the U.S. As a result of this new structure, USCIS and 
ICE are more effectively aligned to foster collaboration in ensuring the integrity of the 
U.S. legal immigration system than what previously existed when all of the immigration 
functions were located within INS. 
DHS Created in 2003 
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From the sample of all USCIS participants, 45% combined to strongly disagree 
and disagree that USCIS and ICE are more effectively aligned to foster collaboration 
while 34% combined to agree and strongly agree that USCIS and ICE are more 
effectively aligned to foster collaboration than what existed under INS. It is not 
uncommon for a major reorganization to take long periods of time to implement; in some 





















USCIS and ICE are More Effectively Aligned to Foster Collaboration than 
what Previously Existed when All of the Immigration Functions were 
Located within INS
 
Figure 4.16. Survey Results of all USCIS Personnel  
Next, the survey results were analyzed to determine if there were any differences 
in perceptions between those hired pre-2003 and post-2003. The data suggests that 
employees who were hired post-2003 generally had higher positive perceptions that the 
new USCIS, ICE, and CBP structure was more effective than what existed under INS. 
The post-2003 sample had a combined rate of 38% for strongly agree and agree who 
perceived that the new alignment was more effective than INS versus 32% for the pre-
2003 sample. Even more significant, the pre-2003 sample had a combined rate of 54% for 
strongly disagree and disagree who did not perceive that the new alignment was more 
effective than INS as compared to only 40% for the post-2003 sample.  
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Figure 4.17. Survey Results on USCIS Personnel Who were Hired Pre-2003 and Post-
2003: Comparing Their Perceptions on Alignment to Foster Collaboration 
Since Immigration Officers and Intelligence Research Specialists are the primary 
USCIS liaison contacts with ICE concerning immigration benefit fraud, it was 
worthwhile to begin with this sample data. A combination of 56 FDNS Immigration 
Officers, Intelligence Research Specialists and FDNS supervisors contributed to the 
research that was specifically designed for FDNS personnel. Before reviewing some of 
the FDNS specific research, it is important to examine some of the data comparisons on 
perceptions between FDNS personnel and Adjudications personnel to gauge 
collaboration with ICE and other items such as the effect on culture within the USCIS 
organizational structure. FDNS and Adjudications personnel are important to this 
research because each fulfills an important mission within USCIS and how each 
perceives collaboration could potentially affect how fraud leads are developed within 
USCIS along with determining levels of future interactions with ICE regarding benefit 
fraud investigations.  
In reviewing the results of the data from Figure 4.18 on the effectiveness of 
USCIS and ICE collaboration and alignment as compared to when all of the immigration 
functions were within INS, there were notable differences between FDNS personnel and 
Adjudications personnel. The results indicated that 17% of the FDNS personnel in the  
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survey combined to either strongly agree or agree while 40% of the Adjudications 
personnel combined to either strongly agree or agree that USCIS and ICE are more 
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Figure 4.18. Survey Results on Comparing FDNS and Adjudications: Comparing Their 
Perceptions on Alignment to Foster Collaboration 
There were other significant differences in perceptions between FDNS and 
Adjudications personnel. In reviewing the results of the data from Figure 4.19 on 
separating the immigration functions into USCIS, ICE and CBP has enhanced the 
integrity of the legal immigration system and made it more secure than what existed 
under INS, 12% of the FDNS personnel in the survey combined to either strongly agree 
or agree while 33% of the Adjudications personnel thought that separating the 
immigration functions has enhanced the integrity of the legal immigration system. More 
striking is that a combined 60% of the FDNS personnel strongly disagreed or disagreed 
with the above statement as opposed to only 35% of Adjudications personnel who 




















Separating the Immigration Functions into USCIS, ICE, and CBP has Enhanced the Integrity of 




Figure 4.19. Survey Results on Comparing FDNS and Adjudications: Comparing Their 
Perceptions on Separating the Immigrations Functions to Enhance 
Integrity 
There are a number of possible reasons of what could be causing the stark 
differences between FDNS and Adjudications personnel regarding perceptions on USCIS 
and ICE collaboration and the effectiveness of separating the immigration functions as 
compared to INS. First, FDNS personnel are the primary liaison officers to ICE and are 
more apt to not only work collaboratively with ICE but are also more directly impacted 
by policies and procedures that govern how USCIS and ICE target benefit fraud. For the 
most part, adjudications personnel are not directly involved in working with ICE, which 
could be a contributing to the higher bias over FDNS personnel in favorably considering 
collaborative efforts between USCIS and ICE and having a positive perception that 
separating the immigration functions has made the legal immigration system more secure 
that what existed under INS.   
One way to measure collaboration is by the number of times groups meet to 
discuss common goals; in this case, interaction between FDNS and ICE. FDNS personnel 
were asked how often they met in person or had teleconferences with ICE to discuss 
benefit fraud or ways to enhance the integrity of the legal immigration system. The 
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highest percentage of participants (64%) indicated that they never communicated with 
ICE in person or on a teleconference. The second highest (16%) indicated that they met 
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Month
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In Person Meetings or Teleconferences
USCIS and ICE Collaboration Frequency
 
Figure 4.20. Survey Results Measuring the Collaboration Frequency between USCIS 
and ICE 
E.  DOCUMENT AND BENEFIT FRAUD TASK FORCES AND 
COLLABORATION FREQUENCIES 
Another method to gauge USCIS and ICE collaboration would be to measure 
perceptions on the ICE led Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force (DBFTF).73 The 
DBFTFs were established in 2006 and designed as multi-agency task forces that bring 
together different agencies to target document and immigration benefit fraud. There are 
currently 17 DBFTFs operating in primarily metropolitan areas of the U.S. The survey 
participants were asked if the DBFTFs were an effective way to increase collaboration on 
benefit fraud investigations. The most interesting outcome from the results of this survey 
question was not the level of agreement or disagreement on whether the DBFTF was an 
effective collaboration tool. Rather, it was that 15% of the participants who indicated that 
they did not know enough about the task force to gauge its effectiveness as a 
                                                 
73 Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force, http://www.ice.gov/partners/idbenfraud/idbenfraudtf.htm 
(accessed December 2008).  
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collaboration tool whether it was located in their area or not and that 30% of the 
participants were not familiar with the ICE DBFTF concept. The DBFTFs were only 
recently established in 2006 and are only currently located in 17 metropolitan areas. Both 
factors could be contributing to why 30% of the USCIS participants were not familiar 
with the DBFTF concept. 
Next, to measure the FDNS level of collaboration with the DBFTFs, participants 
were asked how many times per month did each meet with ICE at the DBFTF to 
collaborate on immigration benefit fraud investigations. A total of 37% of the participants 
indicated that they never meet with ICE at the DBFTF although they have a DBFTF in 
their area while 7% indicated that they met 1 to 4 times per month and 2% indicated that 
they met 5 to 7 times per month whereas 54% noted that they did not have a DBFTF in 
their area.  
The survey results identify opportunities for USCIS in increasing the awareness 
of the DBFTF’s roles and responsibilities in combating immigration benefit fraud and 
also emphasizing the importance of the DBFTFs as a collaboration tool with ICE; 
especially when they are located near USCIS locations. 
F.  USCIS PERCEPTIONS ON COLLABORATION WITH ICE 
To look deeper into some of the collaboration issues between USCIS and ICE, 
FDNS survey participants were asked to write in their own words issues that are helping 
to foster and hamper collaboration. The major themes that contributed to fostering 
effective collaboration focused on work structure and intergroup and interpersonal 
relations. The work structure that has evolved since 2003 has been supportive in 
establishing a framework for USCIS and ICE employees to work across organizational 
lines in combating immigration benefit fraud. The DBFTFs, BFUs (ICE Benefit Fraud 
Units), co-locating ICE and FDNS personnel, formal “joint” policies, and making FDNS 
personnel the primary USCIS liaison officers to ICE have all supported effective 
collaboration. Intergroup and interpersonal relations have also been an important 
component of effective collaboration. Some of the research findings from this survey  
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that have supported effective collaboration include the initiative by USCIS to establish 
liaison with ICE, ICE’s understanding on how USCIS contributes to the benefit fraud 
mission and the importance of mutual respect between both parties. 
 
Effort on USCIS’ part to establish liaison and 
communication
ICE has an understanding of how FDNS personnel 
contribute to the benefit fraud mission
ICE feedback is helpful to ensure ongoing 
communication between ICE and USCIS
FDNS seen as a co-equal partner (mutual respect)
FDNS fills information gaps on behalf of ICE
Develops rapport with individual ICE agents
Intergroup and Interpersonal 
Relations
Enhances collaboration by formally making FDNS the 
liaison to ICE
Formal Policy has provided a framework for shared 
work processes
Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces have
improved liaison
ICE Benefit Fraud Units




Table 4.1. Survey Results of Themes that Support Effective Collaboration between 
USCIS and ICE 
Conversely, elements of work structure, intergroup and interpersonal relations, 
employee development and management issues have also hindered collaboration. The 
survey findings indicated that ICE had too many organizational layers and a lack of 
personnel in key areas. Intergroup relations that contained suspicions, lack of candidness, 
recognition, mutual respect and an “us versus them” mentality thwarted effective 
collaboration. Rotations of ICE personnel from benefit fraud into other ICE units also 
prevented FDNS employees from establishing longer-term collaborative networks with 
their ICE counterparts.  
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Lack of immigration knowledge by ICEEmployee Development
ICE is suspicious of FDNS
Perceived insufficient interest of ICE in immigration fraud
ICE’s lack of respect and mutual understanding of USCIS
ICE elitism toward USCIS
Lack of candid, regular communication and cooperation
ICE’s negative or condescending attitude toward USCIS
“Us versus them” mentality
Insufficient inititative by FDNS to work with ICE
Lack of recognition by ICE when USCIS contributes to 
immigration fraud cases
ICE personalities
Insufficient trust between USCIS and ICE
Intergroup and Interpersonal 
Relations
ICE leadership prioritizes customs issues over immigration
Rotations of ICE personnel decreases familiarity in working with
FDNS personnel
Different goals between USCIS and ICE
Management Issues
ICE organizational structure has too many layers as FDNS 
coordinates with both ICE BFUs and SACs




Table 4.2. Survey Results of Themes that Do Not Support Effective Collaboration 
between USCIS and ICE 
In delving deeper into collaboration issues from USCIS’ perspective, 184 survey 
participants who represented all of the USCIS occupations including Adjudications 
Officer, Supervisor/Manager, Immigration Officer, and Intelligence Research Specialist, 
responded to the following open-ended statement: In order for USCIS and ICE to work 
more collaboratively, I would recommend the following.  
Several important themes emerged from this research, which included joint 
USCIS and ICE training sessions, more communication, co-location, one team, computer 
interoperability, mutual respect for each other and trust. As a subset to the theme on joint 
training, it was also mentioned that more networking and workshops would be beneficial 
in facilitating collaboration between USCIS and ICE. Most importantly, it was noted that 
a better understanding of each other’s mission was also critical. ICE personnel who are 
engaged in benefit fraud detection should have a general understanding of the laws and 
regulations that govern how USCIS administers immigration benefits. Similarly, USCIS 
personnel who work collaboratively with ICE on benefit fraud should have a general 
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understanding of ICE’s benefit fraud priorities to include the ways and means of 
investigating benefit fraud. An understanding of each other’s mission along with more 
communication, co-location, joint training, and computer interoperability can help 
facilitate trust, which is vital between USCIS and ICE in keeping the U.S. legal 
immigration system secure.  
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V.  UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND 
COLLABORATION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
A.  EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF A RE-CREATION VERSUS RE-
ORIENTATION WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
                If you want to truly understand something, try to change it. 
Kurt Lewin 
David Nadler and Michael Tushman suggest different types of organizational 
change in “Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for Managing Reorientation.” As 
background, Nadler and Tushman describe two types of large-scale organizational 
change, incremental and strategic. Incremental change focuses on individual components 
within an organization while strategic change addresses the whole organization.74 
Further, Nadler and Tushman describe a second dimension of change that concerns the 
positioning of change in response to external events. They describe the four classes of 
change as the following. 
• Tuning. Which is incremental change made in anticipation of future 
events. 
• Adaptation. Which is an incremental change in response to external 
events. 
• Reorientation. Strategic change which is made with the luxury of time in 
anticipation of events that may ultimately require organizational change. 
Described as frame-bending changes. 
• Re-creation. Strategic change necessitated by external events, usually ones 
that threaten the very existence of an organization. This type of change 
requires a radical departure from the past and includes shifts in values, 
strategy, culture and is referred to as frame breaking75 
                                                 
74 David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman, “Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for 
Managing Reorientation,” The Academy of Management Executive 3, no. 3 (August 1989): 196. 
75 Ibid. 
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Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 illustrate the types of organizational change and the relative 
intensity of different types of change. Further, Table 5.1 shows the different outcomes of 
organizational change when incremental and strategic change is based on anticipation of 















Figure 5.1. Relative Intensity of Different Types of Change (After: Nadler and 
Tushman, 1989) 
One of the main drivers behind the creation of DHS was the 9/11 attacks. DHS 
was expected to synthesize intelligence, secure borders, protect infrastructure and prepare 
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for the next catastrophe.76 INS was abolished and its immigration functions were 
transferred into DHS. One could categorize the immigration restructure as a re-creation 
or frame-breaking change necessitated by external events and which eventually led to the 
abolishment of INS.77 The creation of DHS caused a shift in values and culture amongst 
not only prior INS personnel but personnel brought in from other agencies to complete 
the formation of ICE and CBP. Nadler and Tushman also highlight that the relative 
intensity of change is further affected by organizational complexity.78 Immigration is a 
very complex business that involves administering immigration benefits to prospective 
aliens such as work authorization, family reunification, refugee and asylum claims, to 
enforcing immigration laws within the U.S. and at its borders. Radically abolishing INS 
and separating the immigration functions, most likely has led to some of the resistance on 
why perceptions of the USCIS participants are still divided on the organizational 
alignment of the immigration functions within DHS, whether the legal immigration 
system was made more secure under USCIS, ICE and CBP than INS, and that 
immigration enforcement is more effective under ICE than INS.   
What can the data tell us about the effects of a frame-breaking organizational 
change from those who were part of INS (pre-2003) and those that were hired post-2003 
under USCIS? The data suggests that employees who were hired pre-2003 were generally 
biased toward perceiving that the new USCIS, ICE, and CBP structure was less effective 
than what existed under INS. 
In reviewing what occurred with the creation of DHS and creating 22 separate 
agencies under one “homeland security umbrella,” the evidence suggests that this was an 
intense, reactive change rather than an anticipative strategic change that would have 
happened over a longer period of time and would have given members of the 
                                                 
76 Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, “Department’s Mission was Undermined from Start,” 
Washington Post, December 22, 2005, A1.  
77 David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman, “Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for 
Managing Reorientation,” The Academy of Management Executive 3, no. 3 (August 1989): 196. 
78 Ibid., 197. 
 60
organization more time to prepare to deal with the change.79 Now, nearly five years after 
the creation of DHS, USCIS has hired many new employees who do not have a history 
with INS where all of the immigration functions which included benefit services, 
investigations and border security were within one organization. Upon moving further 
into the future, one hypothesis is that a “tipping point” will be reached where the majority 
of USCIS employees will agree that separating the immigration functions has fostered 
more alignment within DHS and that due to the complexities of the immigration system it 
is more effective to keep it divided into USCIS, ICE, and CBP than what existed under 
INS. However, a key objective of this research is to determine how organizational change 
can be executed more effectively at the beginning, which hopefully will lead to greater 
organizational effectiveness over the short and long term. Further research is needed to 
discover if the perceptions identified are solely based on the fact that new USCIS 
employees are generally not exposed to ICE (investigation) and CBP (border security) 
activities and their perceptions are based on their USCIS centric viewpoint. Alternatively, 
is it an unfamiliarity with the other immigration functions within DHS? On the other 
hand, do the pre-2003 USCIS employees based on their previous experience, see 
advantages of having the immigration functions under one organizational structure in 
addition to experiencing some of the communication and information sharing difficulties 
that have existed since 2003 between USCIS, ICE and CBP? 
In the following tables, the survey results are categorized into percentages of 
positive, negative, neutral and where applicable “I Don’t Know” perceptions are 
indicated for each survey statement. Percent positive is the combined percentages of 
respondents who answered Strongly Agree or Agree while percent negative is the 
combined percentages of respondents who answered Strongly Disagree or Disagree. 
Percent neutral is the percentage of respondents who answered Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree. 
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 demonstrate the clear benefits of organizational change 
and that organizational change can be favorably received by existing (pre-2003) and 
                                                 
79 David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman, “Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for 
Managing Reorientation,” The Academy of Management Executive 3, no. 3 (August 1989): 196. 
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newer hires (post-2003) who are hired after a major reorganization. Secondly, although 
FDNS was a newly created unit within USCIS, a majority of the survey participants 
generally agreed that it has made an impact in enabling Adjudicators to make more 
informed and accurate decisions on immigration benefits. The survey participants were 
also overwhelmingly positive on the role of effective leadership in formulating 
adjudicative decisions and on the concern for quality of adjudicative decisions on 
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Table 5.2. Results of survey participants: FDNS has made an impact on ensuring the 
integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system by providing advance 
information on fraud to enable Adjudicators to make more informed and 
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Table 5.3. Results of survey participants: Effective leadership plays an important role 
in formulating how I make decisions and use my discretion in making 
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Table 5.4. Results of survey participants: When I adjudicate immigration petitions 
and applications, my main concern is the quality of the adjudicative 
decision. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate some of the challenges to effective organizational 
change as the survey results shown in Table 5.5 indicate that those who were hired prior 
to 2003 generally felt negative (54%) while those hired post-2003 (50%) were generally 
positive about separating the immigration functions into three distinct DHS components. 
Table 5.6 had similar findings in that those hired prior to 2003 (38%) were generally 
positive while those hired after 2003 (55%) were generally positive on how USCIS is 
structured to address immigration benefit fraud. This research supports other findings 
where perceptions and attitudes tend to remain fixed over time, which suggests that there 
is a natural resistance to organizational change.80 Although there is not data available to 
verify if the perceptions of the pre-2003 hires have changed since the creation of DHS, 
there are opportunities for USCIS to change perceptions in the future. There was a wide 
margin on a percentage basis between the pre and post-2003 survey in the Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree category. The pre-2003 sample was 19% and  the post-2003 sample was 
8%. USCIS still has an opportunity to sway the 19% who are still basically undecided 
and move them into a positive perception regarding how it is structured to address 
immigration benefit fraud.   
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Table 5.5. Results of survey participants who responded to: As a member of USCIS, 
I think it was a good idea to separate the enforcement, border security and 
immigration benefit functions into three distinct DHS components 
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Table 5.6. Results of survey participants who responded to: As a member of USCIS, 
I’m satisfied on how USCIS is structured to address immigration benefit 
fraud in ensuring the integrity of the legal immigration system. 
Lastly, the survey participants were presented with an opportunity to implement 
one major change over the next year that would enhance collaboration between the 
immigration components of DHS and increase the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration 
system. The four choices provided were as follows: 1) Do nothing. The immigration 
functions are best suited when divided between USCIS, ICE and CBP, 2) Combine the 
benefit fraud detection functions currently shared between USCIS and ICE into either 
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USCIS or ICE, 3) Combine all of the immigration functions that are currently shared 
between USCIS, ICE and CBP into one immigration agency to facilitate information 
sharing between immigration benefits, investigations and border security, and 4) I would 
not recommend any of the above choices. I would recommend the following course of 
action. Response number 4 was designed for an open-ended response from the survey 
participants who would not recommend responses 1 through 3. 
The results in Table 5.7 continue to follow an established pattern of the pre-2003 
hires being less satisfied with the current DHS immigration structure as compared to the 
post-2003 hires. The findings show that post-2003 hires (20%) are more likely to not 
recommend any changes since the immigration functions are best suited when divided as 
compared to the pre-2003 hires (10%). Despite the fact that the post-2003 hires appear to 
be more satisfied with the current immigration structure, there are a lot more 
opportunities available for DHS to raise positive perceptions in the pre-2003 (10%) and 
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Table 5.7. Results of survey participants who responded to: If I had the opportunity 
to implement one major change over the next year that in my opinion 
would enhance collaboration between the immigration components of 
DHS and increase the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system, I 
would recommend the following. 
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B.  ANALYSIS ON COLLABORATION: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND 
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE USCIS AND ICE 
COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
Bardach defines collaboration as any joint activity by two or more agencies 
intended to increase pubic value by their working together rather than separately.81 
However, collaboration is not always easy to achieve as specialization and the division of 
labor is often looked to for value creation.82 This can be seen in the current U.S. 
immigration structure with specialization that has occurred between USCIS, ICE and 
CBP. Therefore, it will take a combination of intelligent structural differentiation and 
formal hierarchical coordination along with informal working groups between USCIS 
and ICE at the Field and HQ levels to foster effective collaboration. 
Immigration benefit fraud remains a significant homeland security challenge 
despite the fact that INS was abolished and its responsibilities were divided into three 
DHS organizational components. The creation of USCIS, ICE and CBP was designed to 
improve immigration benefit services, law enforcement, and border security issues that 
INS was unable to accomplish both pre and post 9/11. Luther Gulick, who was a legend 
in the field of public administration reminds us that organizing bureaucracy involves 
trade-offs; however, it is necessary to make the trade-off and then manage the 
consequences.83 In Gulick’s tradition, administrative boundaries to control and manage 
important problems such as immigration are now relied upon; to fit somewhat awkwardly 
with a bureaucratic shoehorn, immigration responsibilities into structures created to 
manage them.84 As a result, it is a must to be ready to manage those boundary areas 
actively that do not promote efficiency and effectiveness. For example, a recent DHS 
OIG report has identified deficiencies in how immigration benefit fraud is identified and 
                                                 
81 Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial 
Craftsmanship (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 8. 
82 Ibid., 9. 
83 Donald F. Kettl, “Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration 
Imperative,” Public Administration Review, December 2006, 12. 
84 Ibid. 
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investigated between USCIS and ICE.85 The report highlighted examples that included 
the need for better communication between (USCIS) FDNS and ICE personnel and a 
clearer sense of common mission within USCIS between FDNS and Adjudications.  
It is also noted that USCIS and ICE share numerous responsibilities regarding 
immigration benefit fraud that require them to work cooperatively with each other. For 
DHS to be effective in securing the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system in 
identifying immigration benefit fraud, it requires a multi-organizational solution between 
USCIS, ICE and CBP. This necessitates organizations whose leaders and members are 
willing to work collaboratively across organizational boundaries to reach goals that they 
cannot achieve alone.86  
After five years since the creation of DHS, a review some of the early challenges 
between USCIS and ICE and some of the possible underlying reasons on why USCIS and 
ICE have yet to establish a seamless collaborative network in targeting immigration 
benefit fraud might be in order. As two DHS components that share immigration 
responsibilities, USCIS and ICE do not necessarily share all of the same objectives but 
they do share a common problem.87 USCIS is primarily a service component of DHS 
responsible for administering the legal immigration benefit system. ICE is a law 
enforcement entity primarily focused on immigration investigations and duties from the 
prior U.S. Custom’s Service such as drug trafficking and financial investigations.88 
However, USCIS and ICE share a common problem of immigration benefit fraud. USCIS 
has the adjudications and fraud detection expertise based on a combination of 
Adjudication Officers, Immigration Officers and Intelligence Research Specialists who 
are knowledgeable in immigration law and in developing benefit fraud leads. ICE has the 
law enforcement expertise and authority to investigate immigration fraud along with 
                                                 
85 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud 
Referral Process Redacted-Revised, OIG-08-09 (Washington, D.C.: DHS OIG, 2008) 27-29. 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf (accessed August 2008). 
86 Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, 
Megacommunities How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global 
Challenges Together (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 28. 
87 Ibid., 68. 
88 Scope of ICE Responsibilities, http://www.ice.gov/pi/topics/index.htm (accessed December 2008). 
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expertise in immigration law. Therefore, it would seem logical that USCIS and ICE 
would be best served to work collaboratively in enhancing the integrity of the 
immigration system and providing the most effective service to the American public. 
However, the “dynamic tension” that exists between USCIS and ICE seems to have 
hampered both organizations from optimizing their relationship.89 As noted in 
Megacommunities, this “dynamic tension” often happens when two agencies operate 
simultaneously in the same space. In this case, USCIS and ICE working simultaneously 
on immigration benefit fraud could lead to turf, resource, and pride issues that could 
thwart a collaborative process. However, this is not to say that USCIS and ICE need to 
forgo their own self interests. Rather, to be effective, USCIS and ICE should understand 
that immigration benefit fraud investigations could be more effective than what each 
could develop on their own.90  
In order to firmly establish rules and protocols, USCIS and ICE entered into a 
MOA (Memorandum of Agreement) in 2006.91 This has served to formalize benefit fraud 
referrals from USCIS to ICE. However, as USCIS and ICE have matured within the 
homeland security structure, the MOA has not kept pace with the maturation process of 
the two DHS components. The necessity to evaluate continually the relationship between 
ICE and USCIS in tackling immigration benefit fraud is very important. Adaptability is 
sustainability, especially within the context of homeland security.92 The goal of working 
toward a seamless immigration benefit fraud structure should be paramount to any self 
interests of USCIS and ICE. This type of a mindset will lead to more effective 
immigration benefit fraud prosecutions and enable ICE and USCIS to identify 
immigration benefit fraud threats earlier in the adjudication process.  
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Even an adaptive MOA between USCIS and ICE is insufficient alone. USCIS and 
ICE need to engage at a variety of different levels within their organizations to include 
HQ and Field units. Megacommunities refer to this as the art and science of cross-sector 
engagement. Frequent contact between USCIS and ICE employees is critical in 
developing a better understanding of how each approaches the immigration benefit fraud 
issue and demonstrates a commitment to collaborating effectively. In addition to regular 
meetings, forums with a specific purpose that last over several days are also helpful in 
aiding multi-organizational solutions.93 Megacommunities mentions a variety of formats 
and a structure focusing on “Future Search” that would be most beneficial to USCIS and 
ICE. The “Future Search” model usually lasts two or three days and is held as a large 
plenary session with time afforded for small working group activities.94 The primary 
questions that would be helpful to USCIS and ICE would be: What do we aspire to? 
What is our current reality? And how can we get from here to there? USCIS and ICE 
should aspire to create and maintain a system where they could work collaboratively with 
each bringing their own expertise in immigration benefit fraud to ensure the integrity of 
the U.S. legal immigration system. Further, they should aspire to make corrections and 
evaluate their relationship in a timely manner as homeland security needs evolve. The 
current USCIS and ICE reality is one that is functioning. There are pockets of success 
stories between USCIS and ICE at some locations throughout the U.S. This can be 
attested to by two recent successful benefit fraud investigations by USCIS and ICE in Los 
Angeles, CA and Orlando, FL.95,96 However, USCIS and ICE may not have embedded 
these practices in their organizations throughout the U.S. The challenging question is how 
do USCIS and ICE move from functioning to an optimally functioning multi-
organizational effort in identifying and investigating immigration benefit fraud?    
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First, the importance of USCIS and ICE to collaborate effectively in targeting 
immigration benefit fraud is essential in the national security interests of the U.S. 
Secondly, it is vital that DHS components that have shared interests work collaboratively 
to use limited fiscal resources effectively that are becoming increasingly scarcer. As 
noted in recent GAO testimony to Congress,  
Recent events, such as lead paint in imported children’s products, tainted 
meat, predatory mortgage lending, contract fraud, and national disasters 
like Hurricane Katrina and the attacks of September 11, 2001, raise 
questions among the American people about the capacity of the federal 
government to meet their most pressing needs. Additionally, the nation’s 
long-term fiscal imbalance drives the need for federal agencies to allocate 
increasingly scarce resources in the most efficient and effective way 
possible. The next administration can continue to bring a greater focus on 
improving the performance of federal programs and ensuring that federal 
funds are allocated effectively by building on the strengths of prior 
performance improvement initiatives.97 
It is not only important to use resources more wisely but also to use limited 
federal resources as effectively as possible. Collaborations do not automatically result in 
cost savings or an increased effectiveness in solving shared problems as evidenced by the 
post 9/11 restructuring that moved ATF from the Department of the Treasury to the 
Department of Justice; ostensibly to create synergies with the FBI in targeting terrorism. 
In the five years since the FBI and ATF were merged under the Justice 
Department to coordinate the fight against terrorism, the rival law 
enforcement agencies have fought each other for control, wasting time and 
money and causing duplication of effort, according to law enforcement 
sources and internal documents. 
Their new boss, the attorney general, ordered them to merge their national 
bomb databases, but the FBI has refused. The Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has long trained bomb-sniffing dogs; 
the FBI started a competing program. 
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At crime scenes, FBI and ATF agents have threatened to arrest one 
another and battled over jurisdiction and key evidence. The ATF 
inadvertently bought counterfeit cigarettes from the FBI -- the government 
selling to the government -- because the agencies are running parallel 
investigations of tobacco smuggling between Virginia and other states.98 
Therefore, to achieve cost savings while continuing to ensure the integrity of the 
immigration system seems like a sound justification for USCIS and ICE to work 
collaboratively on immigration issues.  
C.  HOW TRUST AFFECTS COLLABORATION; ORGANIZATIONAL 
TAXES AND DIVIDENDS 
Stephen M. R. Covey, who is a renowned keynote speaker and adviser on 
leadership, states that trust is the hidden variable that affects everything. The reason it is 
hidden in organizations is that leaders are not looking for it in the systems, structures, 
processes and frameworks on which all the day-to-day behaviors hang.99 USCIS and ICE 
should establish trust throughout their collaborative networks from the senior leadership 
levels where policy is established to the operational ranks between USCIS Immigration 
Officers and ICE Special Agents where the operational policy is executed. Steven Covey 
describes some of the negative aspects of low organization trust as “organizational taxes” 
that are not necessarily visible in income statements yet affect an organization’s “bottom 
line.” On the other hand, Covey describes the positive aspects of “organizational 
dividends” found in high trust organizations. The “organizational dividends” increase the 
effectiveness of interrelationships that exist between organizations such as USCIS and 
ICE in finding solutions to shared problems such as immigration benefit fraud. Table 5.8 
describes some of the low trust taxes in detail that can negatively impact the effectiveness 
of a collaborative relationship between USCIS and ICE.100 
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Reduce integrity issues for USCIS and ICE employees by 
building an ethical culture.  Covey suggests hiring for 
character as well as competence.
Fraud 
Covey describes churn as the turnover of stakeholders 
other than employees.  Maintain a high level of trust so 
that USCIS and ICE can demonstrate trust to their 
stakeholders such as other members of the law 
enforcement community and immigration advocacy 
groups.
Churn
Reduce turnover of high performing USCIS and ICE 
personnel by working in a high trust environment
Turnover 
Create a trusting atmosphere between USCIS and ICE 
personnel. 
Disengagement 
Create a USCIS and ICE culture that reduces “office 
politics” and works as one team to strengthen the integrity 
of the legal immigration system. 
Politics 
Reduce cumbersome rules, procedures and policy 
between USCIS and ICE while increasing flexibility and 
accountability. 
Bureaucracy 
Reduce unnecessary duplication of effort between USCIS 
and ICE in enhancing the integrity of the legal immigration 
system 
Redundancy 
Effect on USCIS and ICETax
7 Low Trust Organizational Taxes
 
Table 5.8. Organizational Taxes to Reduce Between USCIS and ICE (After: Covey, 
(2006) 
Table 5.9 describes some of the high trust dividends that can enhance 
collaboration between USCIS and ICE and lead to effective organizational excellence.101 
 
                                                 
101 Steven M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), 254-257. 
 72
Trust is the “bedrock” of collaboration.  Without trust, 
collaboration is merely cooperation. 
Improved 
Collaboration 
Increased trust between USCIS and ICE will allow for each 
to more effectively execute a key component of DHS’
strategy of protecting our nation from dangerous people 
who attempt to utilize the legal immigration system. 
Better Execution 
Partnering between USCIS and ICE based on relationship 
trust rather than just written contracts and policy. 
Strong Partnering 
Because of the complexity of immigration benefit fraud, 
innovation and creativity are needed to effectively target 
and identify it. 
Enhanced 
Innovation 
USCIS and ICE can outperform with less cost- not just 
accelerated growth but profitable growth. 
Accelerated 
Growth 
Shareholder value is increased which equates to more 
effective organizational performance.  In this case, the 
American public as the ultimate “customer” of USCIS and 
ICE receives a more effective and secure legal 
immigration system. 
Increase Value 
Effect on USCIS and ICEDividend
7 High Trust Organizational Dividends
 
Table 5.9. Organizational Dividends to Improve Between USCIS and ICE (After: 
Covey, (2006) 
The survey research found that the perception of trust between USCIS and ICE 
was low when working on immigration benefit fraud cases and that 54 USCIS FDNS 
officers responded to the following statement: There is a significant level of trust between 
ICE and USCIS when working on immigration benefit fraud cases.  
The results showed that 50% of the respondents combined to either disagree or 
strongly disagree while only 22% combined to either agree or strongly agree that there is 
a significant level of trust between ICE and USCIS. Further, 19% neither disagreed nor 
agreed while 9% indicated that they did not know of the level of trust since they have not 
worked with ICE on an immigration benefit fraud investigation. One hypothesis that 
could be causing low trust is the different cultures such as law enforcement versus non-
law enforcement that exists between ICE and USCIS.  
Survey participants were asked to respond to the following statement: Different 
cultures (law enforcement versus non law enforcement) between ICE and USCIS have 
had a minimal impact on establishing a collaborative working relationship. 
It is interesting to compare the survey responses in two different categories, 
USCIS personnel who are not part of FDNS and only FDNS personnel. This comparison 
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provides an opportunity to analyze further how two different organizational groups 
within a DHS component view collaboration with a partner component. A total of 171 
USCIS personnel who are not part of FDNS responded to the previous statement. The 
results showed that 37% of the respondents combined to either strongly agree or agree 
that the impact was minimal while only 21% of the FDNS respondents combined to 
either strongly agree or agree. Further, 40% of the USCIS personnel who are not part of 
FDNS combined to either strongly disagree or disagree while 63% of the FDNS 
respondents combined to either strongly disagree or disagree that different cultures 
between ICE and USCIS had a minimal impact on collaboration. The neither agree nor 
disagree category was 23% for USCIS personnel who are not part of FDNS and 16% for 
FDNS personnel. The findings support other literature on trust in that it is a necessary 
component to effective collaboration. The FDNS perceptions suggest that building trust is 
important to collaboration, especially when different cultures interact to solve common 
problems such as USCIS and ICE in targeting benefit fraud. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE AND COLLABORATION 
A.  USING A “FRAME BENDING” APPROACH FOR FUTURE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that 
there is a need to do so, almost everybody gets busy on the proof.  
John Kenneth Galbraith, American Economist 
This research has demonstrated that a successful organizational transition is 
difficult no matter what benefits or outcomes are touted to support the change. The 
research has shown that there are differences in perceptions between pre and post-2003 
USCIS hires and also between different organizational divisions within USCIS such as 
FDNS and Adjudications. A number of reasons makes change difficult. Nadler and 
Tushman stated that bureaucracies are designed to resist change; it is inherently built into 
the organizational structure.  
Strategic change involving reorganization should not be implemented haphazardly 
in an attempt to address an emerging challenge or to respond quickly to an external event 
such as what happened after 9/11. As mentioned earlier, Nadler and Tushman describe 
the benefits of a reorientation, which begins with solid diagnostic thinking as opposed to 
a re-creation. They describe four principles for effective “frame bending” to help enable 
successful organizational change that follows a path of initiating change, content of 


























Principles of Effective Frame Bending 
 
Figure 6.1. Principles of Effective Frame Bending for Future Reorganizations within 
Homeland Security102  
This model can serve as an effective mechanism to not only assist USCIS but also 
other DHS components in future organizational change initiatives based on mission or 
technological changes within DHS.  
The research completed in support of this thesis suggests that organizational 
change can affect employee perceptions on the effectiveness of the current state versus 
the prior organization. The following describes some of Nadler’s and Tushman’s 
Principles of Effective Frame Bending model and how it can assist USCIS with future 
restructuring efforts that might include people, technological and mission changes. 
Nadler and Tushman suggest that to begin a successful reorientation one must properly 
initiate the change with a careful diagnosis of the success factors that will be needed to 
implement change and a thorough study of current strengths and weaknesses to 
understand what has to change and why. Next, vision is required to allow people to 
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understand how the future state might look once the reorganization is complete. A vision 
helps people who are part of the organizational change to transition from the prior 
organization to the reorientation. The vision allows people in the organization to know 
where they are headed and then to balance new and old ideas from the previous 
organizational state to the new which assists with the transition process.103 Finally, 
sufficient energy is important to initiate change to begin and execute the necessary 
changes. This is critical in that one of the great strengths of organizations is that they 
contain tremendous forces of stability and can be inherently resistant to change, 
particularly change that undermines strongly held values and beliefs.104 This might have 
contributed to the significant differences in perceptions based on USCIS employees who 
were hired prior to 2003 and those hired post-2003 with the creation of DHS. INS had 
remained in the Department of Justice since 1940 and had only undergone internal 
changes since then. The re-creation that occurred after 9/11 might not have had sufficient 
energy to change strongly held values and beliefs about divesting the immigration 
functions across three distinct DHS components. 
Secondly, the Centrality and Three-Theme principle are key components under 
the content of change in keeping change focused and on message. The centrality principle 
focuses on change related to strategic objectives essential to the future well-being of the 
organization. Without a central principle, there is a chance that change will not last and 
forces within the organization will undo the change to the previous organizational state. 
To support the centrality principle, Nadler and Tushman suggest that no more than three 
key themes be used during the organizational change. Themes are helpful in helping 
employees understand change. However, too many themes can be ignored and the more 
important themes can be lost with all of the distractions. 
The Magic Leader and Beyond the Magic Leader comprise the principle of 
leading change. The Magic Leader is an individual who is able to articulate change and 
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capture the hearts and minds of the people in the organization.105 The Magic Leader is 
able to create a sense of urgency to help spur organizational change, deliver an 
inspirational vision, energize, and enable employees to help foster the policies and 
procedures to implement the re-orientation. While the Magic Leader is critical, an 
effective executive team within the organization is needed to create a broader base of 
support and further expound upon the efforts of the Magic Leader.  
Finally, Nadler and Tushman expound upon the necessity to achieve and sustain 
the re-orientation. Successful re-orientations involve a mix of planning and unplanned 
opportunistic actions.106 While it is important to plan, there will be many unforeseen 
events that occur along the way of a re-orientation due to the complexity of today’s 
organizations. The Many-Bullets principle helps to overcome some of the obstacles that 
arise despite the best planning efforts. As noted earlier, organizations are usually resistant 
to change and the Many-Bullets principle emphasizes that managers need to use a variety 
of devices to change behavior and perceptions to support the new organizational 
infrastructure. The Investment-and-Returns principle highlights the amount of effort and 
resources required for large-scale reorganization. Large-scale change is often initially 
expensive; however, savings may be realized at some future end state. It requires 
significant resources and the commitment by senior managers to get involved in a 
number of activities such as senior team meetings, presentations, attendance at special 
events, education, and training to provide the necessary leadership to execute an effective 
re-orientation.107 
B.  USING A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
William Bridges offers additional insight into successfully managing 
organizational change. He suggests in Managing Transitions, Making the Most of Change 
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that it is not the change that is problematic; it is the transition.108 He draws a distinction 
between change and transition. Bridges describes change as situational such as the new 
organizational chart and new policy while transition is the psychological process that 
people go through to come to terms with the new situation. He describes the three phases 
as Ending, Neutral Zone and Beginning. However, there are not clear boundaries between 
the three phases; in fact, some overlap helps solidify the transition. Bridges augments 
Nadler’s and Tushman’s model on organizational change by focusing on a three-part 
psychological process that can be used as a framework to help with organizational 
transition. This process can also be used to aid USCIS with future reorganizational efforts 
or other large-scale technological change such as moving from a paper based to an 




The Three Phases in Managing Transitions
 
Figure 6.2. The Three Phases in Managing Transitions109  
The ending phase in organizational transition allows employees to disengage from 
the past and prepare for a new identity. This is often difficult since employees have their 
status, roles and relationships tied to the old organization. The ending phase is an 
opportunity for employees to seek new training and positions that will undoubtedly result 
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from the reorganization. Bridges also emphasizes that defining what is over and what is 
not is critically important to avoiding confusion during the ending phase.110 He 
elaborates on three serious difficulties that can occur by not specifying what is over and 
what is not over. 
• People will not dare to stop doing anything. They will try to do all the old 
things and the new things. After a while, they will burn out with the 
overload. 
• People will make their own decisions about what to discard and what to 
keep, and the results will be chaos. 
• People will toss out everything that was done in the past, and the baby will 
disappear with the bathwater.111 
Lastly, Bridges advises to treat the past with respect. People often identify their 
self-worth with the prior organization and may resist change if the past is denigrated. The 
survey research that was designed to support this thesis shows that people who were 
employed by INS were less likely to believe in the effectiveness of the new immigration 
structure within DHS. This might be a result of the negative aspects surrounding the INS 
at the time the agency was abolished in 2003. 
The Neutral Zone can be described as the middle transition phase. The new 
organizational state has not yet formed and the old structure is breaking down. Bridges 
describes this time as a discovery of what the new organization can be but it can also be 
fraught with peril as many people will leave a reorganization at this phase.  
The new beginning phase can be characterized by new anxieties since it has now 
been established that the reorganization is real.112 In addition, the new beginning is a 
gamble because there is no guarantee that the new way of doing things will work. One 
can draw parallels to the time when INS was abolished and three new DHS components 
began to share immigration responsibilities within the new DHS structure. Bridges 
poignantly asserts that difficulties with new beginnings come not from a difficulty with 
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beginnings but from a difficulty with endings and neutral zones.113 The focus on endings 
and neutral zones with future organizational change within USCIS or other DHS 
components can help with the psychological impacts of change and make for a more 
successful organizational transition. 
C.  NEXT STEPS IN IMPROVING COLLABORATIVE COMPETENCIES, 
TRUST AND NETWORKS WITHIN HOMELAND SECURITY  
1.  Improving Collaboration through Competencies to Select Future 
Homeland Security Leaders 
In Working across Boundaries, Russell Linden provides a working definition of 
collaboration and lists five collaboration benefits that are also appropriate to USCIS and 
ICE.114 Linden’s working definition of collaboration and five collaboration benefits are 
as follows: 
Collaboration occurs when people from different organizations (or units 
within one organization) produce something together through joint effort, 
resources, and decision making, and share ownership of the final product 
or service. 
Collaboration Benefits. 
• Better use of scarce resources; cost savings 
• Ability to create something that you can’t create on your own 
• Higher quality, more integrated product or service for the end users 
• Potential for organizational and individual learning 
• Better ability to achieve important outcomes115 
So how can USCIS and ICE use this as a model to help embed the concept of 
collaboration through both DHS components? A good start is to begin by improving 
utilization of scarce resources and more cost savings. USCIS and ICE utilize a variety of 
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anti-fraud personnel that focus on identifying and targeting immigration benefit fraud. 
The leadership in USCIS and ICE should be encouraging and rewarding collaborative 
behaviors that lead to successful outcomes such as benefit fraud prosecutions and other 
administrative actions that enhance the security of the legal immigration system 
throughout the U.S. Going forward, DHS needs to utilize its limited resources efficiently 
and effectively. DHS can no longer rely on USCIS and ICE developing benefit fraud 
cases simultaneously on the same person or organization without the other component 
being aware of the developing case. 
Secondly, USCIS and ICE each bring their own expertise to targeting benefit 
fraud. USCIS has the institutional knowledge of regulations that pertain to immigration 
law and experience in administering immigration benefits while ICE has the law 
enforcement knowledge and authorities to investigate benefit fraud. When two 
organizations come together to solve a shared problem, there is an opportunity for shared 
learning, both organizationally and individually. USCIS personnel have the opportunity 
to learn more about the investigation process that they normally would not encounter in 
working within USCIS. ICE personnel have the opportunity to learn more about the 
adjudications process and how immigration benefits are administered. By working 
collaboratively, USCIS and ICE have a much better opportunity for a more effective 
outcome in targeting immigration benefit fraud. By using each component’s expertise, 
USCIS and ICE can create more effective benefit fraud investigations, which ultimately 
will ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system and uphold the rule of law. The 
end result is better service to the American public by keeping the immigration system 
open to those that will add value to U.S. while closing the loop on those that wish harm 
or try to defraud the U.S. immigration system. 
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, immigration is a particular difficult and 
complex issue to administer whether it is housed in one agency effectively such as INS or 
divided among three DHS components such as USCIS, ICE and CBP. Each 
organizational structure adheres to a complicated bureaucracy with competing interests of 
internal and external stakeholders that involve immigration benefits, law enforcement and 
border security issues. As former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner noted in 2000, 
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“Immigration policy doesn’t exist in a vacuum- it intersects with foreign affairs and 
national security, employment, the economy, education, family and community stability, 
criminal justice…I could go on and on.”116 The U.S. faces an enormous challenge in 
admitting immigrants who will contribute to U.S. society while keeping out those that 
will bring harm. One of those challenges involving homeland security is that the U.S. is 
tackling intricate problems whose causes and consequences pay no attention to the 
boundaries created to control and manage them.117 In the current system, the 
“boundaries” divide immigration responsibilities between benefits, law enforcement and 
border security. Sharon Barrios states that the transfer of immigration functions does little 
to alleviate the inherent complexities of the immigration situation.118 Therefore, it is vital 
that USCIS, ICE and CBP take a comprehensive approach to immigration security and 
think of each other as full DHS partners in support of homeland security. Rather than 
radically changing the current DHS immigration structure, DHS leaders should obtain a 
better understanding of how immigration boundaries are drawn between the DHS 
components and then think about how vertical and horizontal authorities can improve the 
existing DHS immigration structure. An important concept to consider is that 
organizations are not just about structure, they are also about people who must be able to 
internalize and adjust to the new changes to execute the new policy effectively after 
reorganization. The outcome would be to build interorganizational linkages that would 
balance vertical forces of hierarchical control from the HQ components of USCIS, ICE 
and CBP, and yet also allow for horizontal level discretion between USCIS Immigration 
Officers and ICE Special Agents to ensure the integrity of the legal immigration 
system.119 As DHS leaders attempt to manage a complex issue such as immigration, they 
will find that it is hard to use vertical structures to hold individuals accountable when 
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they are working in increasingly horizontal partnerships.120 An effective horizontal 
partnership should exist between USCIS and ICE in targeting immigration benefit fraud. 
It is essential to ensure that boundaries do not undermine one of the outcomes that DHS 
originally sought in 2003; to ensure a safe and secure legal immigration system. 
One possible method is to identify collaborative competencies that can be used to 
select future leaders to work across boundaries within DHS. This could be particularly 
important to USCIS and ICE leaders who in their new positions need to collaborate to 
target immigration benefit fraud. In “Identifying Collaborative Competencies,” Heather 
Getha-Taylor conducted a competency study on federal senior executives who were 
recipients of Presidential Rank Awards. The Presidential Rank Award is a highly coveted 
award within the federal service that is conferred to only a select few members of the 
Senior Executive Service each year.121 The Behavioral Event Interview (BEI) research 
revealed that the most significant competencies for collaborative effectiveness are (a) 
interpersonal understanding, (b) teamwork and cooperation and (c) team leadership.122 
These results are significant in that they contrast to what the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) identifies as key competencies for building coalitions.123 The 
research conducted for this thesis also supports some of the findings by Heather Getha-
Taylor. USCIS FDNS indicated that intergroup and interpersonal relations were 
significantly important to effective collaboration between USCIS and ICE. The USCIS 
FDNS participant results of intergroup and interpersonal relations suggest strong 
similarities to Heather Getha-Taylor’s findings of interpersonal understanding, teamwork 
and cooperation, and team leadership. The FDNS results also provide further support for 
human resource managers to identify the necessary skill sets of what is needed for 
effective collaboration in the federal government. It should be noted that the FDNS 
survey did not follow a competency model per se as survey applicants were asked to 
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respond in their own words to what would improve collaboration. The results pointed to 
and mirrored the earlier findings of Heather Getha-Taylor based on a specific 
competency model. However, the outcome of interest was the same for both studies; 
determining what would support effective collaboration. The results of both studies can 
be applicable to other DHS components that have shared missions and have a 
requirement to work horizontally across boundaries. Seeking appropriate leaders who can 
lead collaboratively based on intergroup and interpersonal relations should help DHS 
since many of its homeland security missions requires working vertically and 
horizontally across many federal components as well as state and local entities. 
2.  Importance of Trust in a Collaborative Framework 
How can trust be improved between USCIS and ICE? Establishing trust between 
groups cannot be forced or mandated. It takes time and must be earned through positive 
interactions between groups. Warren Bennis, who is a noted authority on leadership 
principles, indicates that trust is a necessary component in not only getting people on 
your side but also having them stay there.124 He states that there are four ingredients 
leaders have that generate and sustain trust: 
• Constancy. Whatever surprises leaders themselves may face, they do not 
create any for the group. Leaders are all of a piece; they stay the course. 
• Congruity. Leaders walk their talk. In true leaders, there is no gap between 
the theories they espouse and the life they practice. 
• Reliability. Leaders are there when it counts; they are ready to support 
their co-workers in the moments that matter. 
• Integrity. Leaders honor their commitments and promises.125  
USCIS and ICE need leaders who can work in cross-functional work 
environments and demonstrate behaviors that support collaboration and trust. For those 
USCIS and ICE leaders already in place, Bennis describes some of the following contrary 
behaviors to building trust and collaboration that were successful in the past: speaking  
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rather than listening, valuing people like yourself over people of different genders or 
from different cultures, doing things on your own rather than collaborating, making 
decisions yourself instead of asking people for their perspectives.126  
USCIS and ICE leaders should move beyond their own interests to support the 
overall strategy and goals of DHS. Building trust seems to be particularly beneficial to 
USCIS and ICE in targeting immigration benefit fraud. Trust can be an important 
coordination mechanism for USCIS and ICE since hierarchical control and policies 
cannot effectively solve the uncertainties and complexities of immigration benefit 
fraud.127 
3. Using Networks to Strengthen Collaboration 
A network is one way to think about the USCIS and ICE relationship. It is a 
network comprised of Special Agents, Criminal Research Specialists, Intelligence 
Research Specialists, Immigration Officers and Adjudications Officers. This network can 
only be effective by mutual respect for each other’s role in the immigration benefit fraud 
process. It also critical that USCIS and ICE leadership support the network, as leadership 
and culture can either support or nullify the best network designs.128 Leaders can have a 
significant impact and contribute to the success of organization. In this case, leaders who 
recognize and acknowledge collaborative work or promote people who effectively 
collaborate across organizational lines. This sends a powerful signal to the “immigration 
benefit fraud” network that collaboration is in furtherance of the public good.129 
Likewise, leadership can also reduce people’s willingness to connect in a network by 
reducing morale and fostering internal competition.130 A continued commitment to the 
ICE led Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces (DBFTF) is a practical way to 
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strengthen effective networks between USCIS and ICE from a work management 
perspective. Working together allows USCIS and ICE employees to develop awareness 
of each other’s expertise and build social ties that enable a familiarity and comfort level 
to work collaboratively.131 This can also help build competence-based trust between 
USCIS and ICE personnel in collaborating on benefit fraud cases. Both parties need to 
feel confident that the person who was sought out for advice, expertise or information is 
knowledgeable in respect to immigration law, fraud and law enforcement concerns. To 
emphasize the importance of personal contact, one study revealed that after a state-of-the-
art profiling system was used to determine people’s strengths, it was the face-to-face 
contact that determined trust between group members and whether or not they would 
reach out to others within the group for information.132  
Culture is also important to support a healthy and effective cross-organizational 
network. This is especially true for USCIS and ICE because it can override collaborative 
behaviors encouraged by formal design.133 It is important that leaders consider the 
different cultural aspects of law enforcement and non-law enforcement agencies who 
work together to solve common problems; in this case, ensuring the integrity of the legal 
immigration benefits system. Traditionally, law enforcement cultures are not apt to share 
information with non-law enforcement entities. The cultural differences between USCIS 
and ICE are further exacerbated by the multitudes of cultures that have not only been 
brought into USCIS and ICE since the creation of DHS but also new cultural values that 
have been established with the creation of the two DHS components. For example, 
consideration should be given to U.S. Customs Service, INS, USCIS and ICE cultural 
values in thinking about effective collaboration between USCIS and ICE. Therefore, it 
should not be a given that effective collaboration will automatically exist based on policy 
or organizational charts. USCIS and ICE leaders need to continually evaluate and reward 
instances of collaborative behavior to reinforce positive behaviors in maintaining 
effective working relationships. One way of overcoming cultural differences is to focus 
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on an overarching goal such as the ensuring the security of the legal immigration system 
rather than the non-law enforcement or law enforcement aspects between USCIS and 
ICE.134  
Another avenue of enhancing collaborative efforts is by the use of boundary 
spanners. As noted in the The Hidden Power of Social Networks, boundary spanners are 
people who provide critical links between two groups defined by functional affiliation, 
physical location or hierarchical level. Since a network allows people to share different 
kinds of expertise, a boundary spanner could connect both groups such as USCIS and 
ICE without promoting excessive connectivity.135 It is important to note that not 
everyone is suited to be a boundary spanner as he or she would need a breadth of subject 
knowledge, social contacts and the personality traits to be accepted by USCIS and ICE 
personnel.136 Boundary spanners can be motivated by goal setting and other rewards to 
ensure that effective personal networks are enhanced and integration is improved on a 
consistent basis between USCIS and ICE in targeting immigration benefit fraud. They 
can also assist with facilitating common interests and language such as procedures, 
policies, and priorities passed through the USCIS and ICE network.137 It is important to 
note that this should not just support information sharing but also knowledge sharing for 
long-term problem solving capacity. 
Lastly, developing Collaborative Capacity Builders (CCBs) is another method to 
sustain and continue to build an effective USCIS and ICE network into the 21st century. 
A CCB is someone who has the expertise or is respected within a network who plays a 
lead role in ensuring the knowledge is sent, received and integrated in enhancing 
                                                 
134 Rob Cross and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks, Understanding How Work 
Really Gets Done in Organizations (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004), 128. 
135 Ibid., 74. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Edward Weber and Anne M. Khademian, “Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and 
Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 2 
(March/April 2008): 338. 
 89
collaborative capacity.138 Weber and Khademian posit six commitments of CCBs below 
that focus on the softer side of network effectiveness rather than structural connections. 
• A commitment to governance with government 
• A commitment to govern within the rules yet think creatively 
• A commitment to networks as mutual-aid partnerships with society 
• An acceptance that a CCB can be someone without an official government 
portfolio 
• An understanding of the intrinsic inseparability of performance and 
accountability in wicked problem settings 
• A persistent commitment to the collaborative process139 
Although all of the commitments are important to the USCIS and ICE network, 
two in particular are of significant importance. First, as USCIS and ICE collaborate 
through their respective external boundaries within DHS, it is important to be able to 
govern within the rules based on existing policies, procedures and Memorandums of 
Agreement with an openness to think about new ways to solve problems such as 
immigration benefit fraud. Rules-based systems are inadequate to solve complex 
problems that require new ways of thinking such as how immigration benefit fraud can be 
deterred or how to maintain an effective collaborative capacity between USCIS and 
ICE.140 Secondly, the intrinsic inseparability of performance, capacity and accountability 
is also important to maintain not only the network but also to ensure that sending, 
receiving and integrating knowledge continues to build capacity. It is essential to keep the 
USCIS and ICE network engaged for the future while meeting the needs of other 
stakeholders such as CBP, DOS, DOL, and other federal and state agencies that have an 
interest in reducing immigration benefit fraud. A CCB would be responsible for finding 
areas of mutual gain and sharing burdens such as costs to sustain a collaborative network 
for the foreseeable future. 
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D.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON FUTURE LEADERSHIP FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
In conclusion, this thesis has reviewed aspects of the U.S. immigration structure 
that existed before and after the creation of DHS. It provided specific research into the 
area of organizational change and collaboration, which is central to the effectiveness of 
homeland security and DHS.   
USCIS requires leaders who understand the “knowable” and “complex” regarding 
homeland security. In administering the U.S. immigration benefits system, senior leaders 
can focus on knowable areas such as what types of security checks are needed for 
applicants’ who apply for immigration benefits or the type of information that needs to be 
collected from an immigration petition or application. Leaders are able to organize and 
control functional outputs surrounding these examples that can support strategic 
intentions for both USCIS and DHS.141 There is a clear relationship between cause and 
effect. However, in the domain of complexity, issues remain open and continue to evolve 
despite the best efforts at prediction. There is not a clear relationship between cause and 
effect. Some examples of complex challenges that lie ahead for USCIS include balancing 
its customer service and security mission, administering an adjudications system based on 
risk, developing more effective relationships with its law enforcement and intelligence 
community partners in identifying national security threats, the role of contractors in 
shaping the future of USCIS, establishing a USCIS culture that is customer service 
oriented yet mindful of national security and immigration fraud, problems the new 
USCIS Transformation will solve and create, and the impact on homeland security on 
increasing or decreasing the speed of adjudicating immigration benefits.142,143 All of the 
issues mentioned in the complexity domain require a new way of thinking where order 
and standards-based behavior are ineffective.   
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While no one can predict the future to overcome problems in the complexity 
domain, there are leaders who possess skills that can position their organizations for 
success. An anticipatory leader is one who has the capability of being a futurist, strategist 
and an integrator.144 As futurists, they think beyond the obvious to study patterns and 
emerging trends and how external forces shape their organization. As strategists, they are 
able to see possibilities from new trends and communicate this new insight to their 
organization. This allows the organization to take advantage of new opportunities and to 
minimize threats. As integrators, they can reframe the thinking of others, create 
compelling organizational cultures and possess keen emotional insight to empower 
people to find solutions that they once thought were impossible.145 This would be a 
sound model for leaders to aspire to in preparing to solve the complex challenges within 
homeland security since it is in a continually changing environment. “Anticipatory” 
leaders who could take advantage of emerging, relatively unseen opportunities and create 
strategies on these new opportunities would raise the possibility of keeping the U.S. 
homeland secure into the foreseeable future.   
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APPENDIX. 
• Krassimir Simeonov, 39, of Roswell, Ga., was sentenced by U.S. District 
Court Judge Bryan Harwell of Florence for his role in arranging bogus 
marriages for U.S. citizens and Bulgarian nationals so they could seek 
permanent U.S. residency status146 
• With the arrest of seven Indians, U.S. authorities have claimed to have 
busted an immigration racket run by an IT company owner who charged 
tens of thousands of dollars from expatriates by fraudulently sponsoring 
their H-1B work visas147 
• A ringleader in a massive marriage fraud scheme was sentenced to nearly 
3 1/2 years in prison yesterday by a judge who criticized the man for 
saying he had arranged more than 100 phony marriages only to help 
fellow Ghanaian immigrants stay in the United States148  
• Attorney Jonathan Saint-Preux was indicted on October 5 with his wife, 
Michele, and another man on federal charges that they submitted 
fraudulent documents to help hundreds of undocumented immigrants stay 
in the U.S. Saint-Preux, who pleaded innocent, attended the White House 
party on November 30, said his attorney, Patrick Toscano149 
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